By February 2017, more than 74,000 Rohingya had fled to Bangladesh, straining the ability of the government and international humanitarian actors to respond and revealing persistent political barriers and coordination deficiencies in the humanitarian response. The 74,000 Rohingya who arrived after October 2016 are referred to by the Government of Bangladesh and international humanitarian actors as “new arrivals,” effectively creating three distinct groups of Rohingya in the country: the 33,000 government-recognized refugees, the 200,000 to 500,000 UMN, and the 74,000 new arrivals (though new arrivals are also considered UMN). The lack of citizenship renders the Rohingya one of the largest stateless populations in the world, a status which leaves them particularly vulnerable to exploitation, detention, and abuse. In May 2017, RI carried out a mission to Bangladesh to assess the humanitarian situation for both the new arrivals and the hundreds of thousands of Rohingya already living in Bangladesh prior to October 2016. RI visited a number of the Rohingya makeshift settlements and camp-like settings, interviewing dozens of Rohingya. Most of those interviewed were recent arrivals (some having arrived just within a few days), but RI also interviewed longer term residents, including some living in official refugee camps for more than 20 years. RI also met with a variety of humanitarian actors and experts, including UN officials and representatives of international non-governmental organizations. Precarious Existence for Rohingya in Bangladesh Rohingya have long faced a precarious existence in Bangladesh. With only 33,000 of the hundreds of thousands of Rohingya recognized as refugees by the government, the vast majority are living without the basic protections afforded to refugees. Without formal identification or access to work, they are living in limbo, struggling to survive and vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. If arrested, their stateless status (not to mention their well-founded fear of return to Myanmar) leaves no obvious place for them to be returned, leaving the constant threat of indefinite detention. The makeshift shelters in which most live are barely inhabitable in the heat of summer and vulnerable to the high winds and heavy rains of the monsoon season. Even for the relatively small number of refugees officially recognized by the government, prospects are grim. While they have better shelters and services, a majority have lived their entire lives in the camps and have no obvious alternative in the near future. Bangladesh is not a party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, and it suspended resettlement of refugees to third countries in 2010. The people of Bangladesh have often shown a sense of solidarity with Rohingya fleeing Myanmar, assisting new arrivals and living peacefully alongside longer term residents. But the large numbers have also brought tensions and created political opposition. The reluctance of the Government of Bangladesh to recognize Rohingya as refugees, despite their fleeing violence and persecution, stems largely from a fear of creating “pull factors” that would bring more Rohingya into an already densely populated country. Rohingya are often perceived and portrayed as illegal migrants stealing the jobs of the host population. The many Rohingya living in makeshift settlements near the beaches in Cox’s Bazar and Teknaf are seen by the government as a detriment to plans to develop the tourist industry. Despite these concerns, the Government of Bangladesh appears to have recognized humanitarian imperatives surrounding this population and has improved its response in ways that longtime observers say were barely imaginable some years ago. A 2014 “National Strategy on Myanmar Refugees and Undocumented Myanmar Nationals (UMN)” overseen by the National Task Force, made up of 22 ministries and agencies, has led to expanded access and protection services to UMN in 5 www.refugeesinternational.org