A Typology of Statelessness Conclusion: Therefore, individuals must be an object of international law. While the binary premise is just assumed, the elimination premise is supported by several arguments.22 Proponents of the object theory argue that individuals cannot be a subject of international law for several reasons. First, they have neither rights nor duties therein. Second, they cannot invoke international law for protection. Third, they cannot commit violations of international law. Fourth, they are impaired or benefitted if, and only if, there ‘is a right or duty on the State to protect their interests’.23 However, the object theory has increasingly been questioned. Its opponents contend that it is (1) based on a false binary, (2) immoral in treating individuals as objects, (3) detrimental to the democratic conception of the state and (4) not reconcilable with current practice.24 Thus, they suggest that individuals must hold an in-between position.25 Given its appeal to facts rather than ideals, the last objection seems to pose the greatest challenge to a positivist defence of the object theory. It contends that the position of all individuals has, in fact, been improved with the emergence of the UN. This improvement manifests itself in international criminal law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law and with respect to international claims. In terms of international criminal law, individuals arguably became subjects of international law in 1945, when it was decided that anyone can be assigned individual criminal responsibility.26 The Nuremberg Trials are probably the most well-known example of individuals being put on trial for committing specified crimes, including crimes against peace and crimes against humanity.27 International humanitarian law conceivably uplifts the status of individuals to subjects of international law by creating several safeguards for those who find themselves in the middle of an armed conflict.28 For instance, the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which addresses the situation of prisoners of war, says in art 13 that ‘prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated’.29 Moreover, in art 78, it more explicitly uses the language of rights by declaring that ‘prisoners of war shall have the right to make known to the military authorities in whose power they are, their requests regarding the conditions of captivity to which they are subjected’.30 It is the same case in art 48 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons which says ‘protected persons who are not nationals of the Power whose territory is occupied, may avail themselves of the right to leave the territory’.31 There are several ways in which the position of individuals has been improved with respect to international claims. First, since 1945, individuals have been 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 ibid 444; Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in International Law’ (1978) 4(1) British Journal of International Studies 1, 5. Manner (n 20) 428. ibid 430–31. ibid 447; Higgins (n 22) 5. Parlett (n 19) 229. ibid 274. ibid 224–25. Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950). ibid; Parlett (n 19) 183. Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) art 48. 241