A Typology of Statelessness stronger discrimination in the admission process.57 In other words, Syrian and North African refugees are denied the social recognition that is granted to Ukrainians. Besides immigration admission, naturalisation is another example that shows how closely legal recognition and social recognition are intertwined. Today, citizenship is mostly framed, not as a basic right, but a privilege that must be earned.58 The United Kingdom’s naturalisation process is paradigmatic for this wider praxis. It requires temporary residence for five years to be eligible for ‘probationary citizenship’, followed by ‘evidence of continuing economic contribution and successful completion of the “Knowledge of Life in the UK” and English language tests’ as well as another year of additional examinations.59 As with asylum, there seems to be a similar pattern of discrimination in terms of who is granted nationality and who is not. Switzerland is an illustrative case since, for many years, several of its municipalities have used referendums to decide on naturalisations. Drawing on a large data set of votes from 1970 to 2003, Jens Hainmueller and Dominik Hangarten show that the country of origin is by far the most important determinant of naturalization success. The average proportion voting ‘no’ in the naturalization referendums is about 13– 15 percentage points higher for applicants from (the former) Yugoslavia and Turkey compared to observably similar applicants from richer northern and western European countries who apply in the same municipality at the same time.60 While economic status and length of residency also have a positive, yet much smaller, correlation, language skills and integration status do not seem to matter at all.61 Hence, their findings also suggest that social recognition is less tied to merits than to an essentialist image of the ‘Other’. THREE SUBTYPES OF STATELESSNESS A theoretical framework that focuses on the tight connection between legal and social recognition as well as the sources of deprivation allows me to identify three different subtypes of statelessness. The first is voluntary statelessness where (a) the stateless individual is the source of legal non-recognition themselves and (b) legal non-recognition and social non-recognition by the country of origin do not necessarily coincide. The second subtype is structural statelessness where (a) international law is the source of legal non-recognition and (b) legal nonrecognition and social non-recognition by the country of origin do not necessarily coincide. The third subtype is denigrative statelessness where (a) the country of 57 58 59 60 61 See Kirk Bansak, Jens Hainmueller, and Dominik Hangartner, ‘How Economic, Humanitarian, and Religious Concerns Shape European Attitudes toward Asylum Seekers’ (2016) 354(6309) Science 217, 217–22; Melissa De Witte, ‘Ukrainian Refugees Face a More Accommodating Europe, Says Stanford Scholar’, Stanford News (online, 24 March 2022) <https://news.stanford.edu/2022/03/24/ukrainian-refugees-face-accommodating-europesays-stanford-scholar/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/VK6H-ESB3>. Nisha Kapoor, Deport, Deprive, Extradite: 21st Century State Extremism (Verso 2018) 104– 11; see also Margaret Somers who calls this ‘the contractualization of citizenship’: Margaret R Somers, Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights (Cambridge University Press 2008) 2–3. Kapoor (n 58) 93. Jens Hainmueller and Dominik Hangartner, ‘Who Gets a Swiss Passport? A Natural Experiment in Immigrant Discrimination’ (2013) 107(1) American Political Science Review 159, 160. ibid 161. 245