A Typology of Statelessness large number of Rohingya were coercively denationalised and expelled from the territory by the military Government, which was thereby denying its legal obligation to take legal responsibility for their protection. Although former Burma (today’s Myanmar) was not a signatory to the 1961 Convention, the military government justified the coercive denationalisation of the Rohingya in a way that resonates with art 8(3). In arguing that the rapid population growth of the Muslim population would be a threat to the vital interests of the country, Burmese and Rakhine leaders appealed to its central provision while denigrating the Rohingya.125 Yet, as in the case of Shamima Begum, the coercive denationalisation of the Rohingya was based on their racialisation. In this Part, I have presented several examples of denigrative statelessness where the source of legal deprivation is the country of origin. Moreover, I have suggested that denigrative statelessness is likely to involve the deprivation of legal, as well as social, recognition. This becomes especially evident in cases of denationalisation and persecution. Shamima Begum and the Rohingya have not only been rendered de jure stateless, but they have also been denied the status of moral equals who deserve to be treated with dignity. Thus, denigrative statelessness gives a name to the worst cases of statelessness, where someone is at a great risk of violence by the country of origin. CONCLUSION In this article, I have made three arguments. First, I have argued that legal statelessness can be best understood through the two concepts of responsibility and recognition. On the one hand, the stateless have no country that effectively takes responsibility for their protection. On the other, their statelessness is arguably caused by a combination of legal and social deprivation. Second, I have identified three different subtypes of statelessness. They derive from the source of legal deprivation and include voluntary statelessness, structural statelessness and denigrative statelessness. Third, I have suggested that legal and social nonrecognition do not necessarily coincide in the case of voluntary and structural statelessness, whereas they seem closely intertwined in the case of denigrative statelessness. A comprehensive response to statelessness must address the latter problem. I hope that the formal typology of statelessness developed here can offer a helpful framework for such an endeavour. 125 ibid 456. 255