Banal dehumanisation 77 upholds the importance of the individual, of individual liberty, dignity, equality, as well as the capacity for solidarity. It actively inhibits individuals’ capabilities. Putting someone into this situation of vulnerability is made possible by banal dehumanisation, while making someone vulnerable to others in these ways contributes to her/is dehumanisation. Being vulnerable to someone or some thing means that one’s capacity to act with agency in particular instances is impaired. This also may include a lack of confidence that a course of action will be possible, a lack of self-esteem, or fear of a loss of basic functionings. That is, for example, Chapter 4’s ‘unwanted’ noncitizens may refrain from reporting to law enforcement authorities when they are the victims of crime or avoid seeking help in other ways, for fear of deportation or loss of other rights. It also impedes an individual’s freedom to be moral and the freedom to follow the rules. That is, an individual may be forced to steal in order to eat and be prevented from helping others. At its most basic and most symbolic, those who find themselves in activated noncitizen relationships and unable to realise their most basic of capabilities may feel themselves obliged to cross State borders (internal, like those to labour markets and external, like those to the territory) irregularly in order to access those capabilities otherwise denied to them. Vulnerability is inevitable when humans come into contact with each other. State institutions can institutionalise it, protect against it, or mitigate its effects. In and of itself, this vulnerability may not be a bad thing. In fact, some have written of the importance of our human dependency upon each other.50 However, it is important to examine how this dependency is managed and distributed within the existing structure, and so how it is experienced by individuals. In the activated noncitizen relationship, a person is exposed to a vulnerability that is not matched by structural mitigation and is not distributed fairly. As such, persons with activated noncitizenship bear burdens of the creation and sustaining of the State that are not associated with its benefits. Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth open their 2005 paper on the relationship between autonomy, vulnerability, recognition and justice by stating that ‘[o]ne of liberalism’s core commitments is to safeguarding individuals’ autonomy. And a central aspect of liberal social justice is the commitment to protecting the vulnerable’.51 They see autonomy as a ‘set of capacities to lead one’s own life’ and focus on the implications of a liberal obligation to reduce autonomy-related vulnerability. This book moves slightly away from Anderson and Honneth’s position by referring specifically to vulnerability to the State in question as a motivator of obligations in that State. Indeed, the challenge posed to this core liberal commitment by the raw vulnerability with which activated noncitizenship may currently be 50 For example, see Judith Butler (2005) Undoing Gender, Routledge. 51 Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth (2005) ‘Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice’, in John Christman and Joel Anderson (eds) Autonomy and the Challenge to Liberalism: New Essays, Cambridge University Press.