Banal dehumanisation 73 describes self-respect as ‘perhaps the most important primary good’.42 Joel Feinberg adds one further dimension to this, describing self-respect as the recognisable capacity to assert claims.43 It seems likely that all of these elements are important. As such, if we are to examine claims-making from a theoretical perspective, it is crucial also to acknowledge social and psychological factors that affect the sorts of claims that can be imagined. The reasons given for the ‘expulsion’ of ‘unwanted’ noncitizens described here include the protection of national coherence, integrity and safety. These are similar to the justifications sometimes given for torture and it is helpful to consider parallels.44 Different perspectives on torture can be traced particularly through the evolution of the work of Henry Shue. In his 1978 discussion paper, Shue initially allowed that there are some situations in which torture could be justified where it would prevent extreme catastrophe. However, in his 2005 follow-up, explicitly responding to the release of the so-called ‘Guantanamo Papers’, he had changed his mind. His reasons for this are useful to consider in the current context.45 Shue argues that there is no guarantee that the dehumanising practices of torture will remain rare if they are ever allowed.46 That is, if torture is considered to be acceptable in some urgent and exceptional cases, then the scope of these cases can easily become less and less exceptional. While in 1978 he thought that there might be situations in which torture would be defensible, Shue explains that, in the light of what occurred at the Guantanamo Bay detention centre, where American army guards subjected inmates to widespread inhumane and degrading treatment, this point of view cannot be sustained. That is, he argues that even if, morally, there were (he says that there are, I am not sure that there are) some situations where, all other things being equal, torture might be justified, unavoidable real-world ramifications counteract this. For Shue, the worry is that even allowing torture theoretically risks it becoming more widely acceptable. I add that it also changes the theoretical basis for society built on 42 John Rawls (1971) A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press. 43 Feinberg 1970 ibid. p. 257. 44 Legally, torture is defined by the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Article 1: ‘Torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflated on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in, or incidental to lawful sanctions.’ 45 Karen Greenberg and Joshua Dratel (eds) The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, Cambridge University Press. 46 Henry Shue (2005) ‘Torture in Dreamland: Disposing of the Ticking Bomb’, Case Western Reservation Journal of International Law 37 p. 238; see also Henry Shue (1978) ‘Torture’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 7(2).