22 Noncitizenism noncitizenship is constructed and how it is justified. This is an important departure from common discourses. Other approaches to the human rights of such individuals have difficulty allocating the associated duties. Acknowledging the noncitizen relationship does not give rise merely to humanitarian claims, but to directed claims of justice based on how the liberal State and the system of States are constructed. One way to see this is through the development of debate on coercion – and particularly coercion at State borders.34 Noncitizenship allows us to see how this form of border-zone coercion extends beyond the border. Broadly, we can understand that ‘whenever coercion takes place, one will is subordinated to the other. The coerced is no longer a completely independent agent’.35 At the border, coercion of this sort can be identified: an individual who wants to cross a border and is prevented from doing so, or is forced to cross in a dangerous manner, is no longer acting freely. S/he is made vulnerable to the State(s) involved and to other individuals with regard to her/is capability to function and to act. In fact, noncitizen coercion by States does not only take place at the border, but this example helps to illustrate something larger. Several writers (e.g. Arash Abizadeh, Phillip Cole, Joseph Carens, Bas Schotel)36 have examined the problem of trying to justify control at a State border, arguing that it looks concerningly illiberal. Others query whether border control can really be understood as coercive in this way at all. David Miller argues that what takes place at the border is not coercion, but prevention.37 Unlike coercion, prevention rules out one option from a set of options. Coercion, by contrast, forces a specific action. As such, for Miller, border control does not threaten autonomy and does not require justification of the sort called for by Arash Abizadeh, for example.38 However, this focuses only on one side of what is taking place and ignores the large literature on prevention more generally as coercive. When converted into the language of vulnerability vis-à-vis capability, this is even clearer. Indeed, writers on coercion argue that forcing someone to perform some particular act can be effected by preventing her/im from performing other acts. 34 This debate is rehearsed for example in Tendayi Bloom and Verena Risse (2014) ‘Examining hidden coercion at state borders: why carrier sanctions cannot be justified’, pp. 65–82 in Ethics and Global Politics 7(2). 35 Gerald Dworkin (1970) ‘Acting Freely’, pp. 367–383 in Nous 4, at p. 367. 36 Arash Abizadeh (2008) ‘Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No right to Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders’, pp. 37–65 in Political Theory 36; Joseph Carens (1987) ‘Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders’, pp. 251–273 in The Review of Politics 49; Phillip Cole (2000) Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration, Edinburgh University Press; Bas Schotel (2012) On the Right of Exclusion: Law, Ethics and Immigration Policy, Routledge. 37 David Miller (2010) ‘Why Immigration Controls are not coercive: A Reply to Arash Abizadeh’, pp. 111–120 in Political Theory 38. 38 Arash Abizadeh (2010) ‘Democratic Legitimacy and State Coercion: A Reply to David Miller’, pp. 121–130 in Political Theory 38.