Surviving Overlapping Precarity in a 'Gigantic Hellhole' stems from discrimination based in law or is a product of state succession. 29 Statelessness is categorically different from being undocumented. 30 However, the UNHCR #IBelong campaign further details that being undocumented, for instance, by virtue of no longer having access to one’s birth certificate, or through circumstances of displacement, raises the risk of statelessness. 31 Indeed, this was already the position of some children born to Venezuelan refugees in Colombia. 32 Since producing birth certificates is often challenged by substantial bureaucratic hurdles when in displacement, the children of Venezuelan refugees can sometimes obtain neither Colombian identity documentation nor Venezuelan identity documentation. 33 This may leave them in a situation of statelessness. With so many Venezuelan asylum seekers in Brazil, in a protracted crisis amid the COVID-19 pandemic, we predict that similar hurdles may produce similar challenges in this country. Promisingly, Brazil is one of the few countries with a Statelessness Determination Procedure (‘SDP’), established as a part of its 2017 New Immigration Law. 34 Indeed, famous stateless activist Maha Mamo recently gained Brazilian citizenship after she was formally recognised as stateless under this new SDP. 35 We expect that the possibility of statelessness may increase due to the uncertainty of status and increased immobility that many Venezuelan refugees face during the pandemic in Brazil. However, a functioning SDP at least offers a channel of remedy in case they find themselves in need of status determination. CONCLUSION Our research has found that the circumstances during the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil, greatly aggravated by a poor public policy response, has made Venezuelan LGBTQI+ asylum seekers and undocumented migrants especially vulnerable. The elimination of their livelihoods, uncertainty around their legal status, and the discrimination and violence they face highlight the dangers of ‘politically produced precarity’ and ‘overlapping precarity’. 36 Furthermore, there is a raised risk of statelessness. Since producing documentation becomes difficult in displacement, which has been compounded by the stagnation of bureaucratic processes during the COVID-19 pandemic, we also point to this real possibility of statelessness that deserves further exploration. Ultimately, there needs to be better coordination between the Brazilian and international and local organisations working with asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. Reports indicate that if borders re-open in 2021, an additional 1.6 million Venezuelans will leave the country. 37 This exodus will add 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 ibid. ibid. ibid. Sergio Held, ‘Venezuelan Crisis: Stateless Children Facing Limbo in Colombia’, Al Jazeera (online, 21 Aug 2019) <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/8/21/venezuelan-crisisstateless-children-facing-limbo-in-colombia>. ibid. Law No 13,445 2017 (Brazil) art 26 (Migration law). Tim Gaynor, ‘Brazil Makes Dream of Belonging Come True for Stateless Activist’, unhcr.org (News Report, 4 October 2018) <https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2018/10/5bb6394a4/brazil-makes-dream-belongingtrue-stateless-activist.html>. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (n 14) 28. Organization of American States (n 19) 4. 161