4 ODI Policy brief for practical purposes, of the authorities in control of a territory’ (Coppieters, 2018), while still withholding any endorsement of that claim to authority. Thus, when employed analytically, the term ‘de facto’ serves to recognise a political reality (and a deviation from the significantly more clearly defined boundaries and responsibilities of de jure governance); however, in diplomatic and political fora, designating an entity as ‘de facto’ has clear political implications – it is at once an act of acknowledgement of that entity’s existence and a simultaneous refusal to grant it the legitimacy of full recognition. This note focuses on de facto states, recognising the overlaps in the challenges of engaging with de facto states and with other forms of de facto governance. A better understanding of the consequences of non-recognition for de facto states and those living in them can offer insights into the policy options open to actors wishing to engage in more productive ways with all kinds of de facto entities. ‘De facto statehood’ Despite the growth of a substantial body of literature on ‘de facto states’ over the past three decades (Pegg, 2017), the criteria used to define ‘de facto statehood’ vary substantially between analyses. Florea (2014) identifies 34 de facto states in existence between 1945 and 2011, while other scholars, adopting more exclusive criteria, have counted significantly fewer. In a case study of European de facto states, de Waal (2018) argues that, of the non-recognised entities in the former Soviet Union, only Abkhazia and Transnistria should be considered ‘de facto states’ (while South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics should not, due to their limited international relations and low degree of autonomy from their patron states). This note uses a broad definition of ‘de facto states’ – focusing less on the specific parameters or typologies of different kinds of de facto governance, and aiming instead to sketch out some of the key ways in which non-recognition and the absence of fully fledged statehood have not only symbolic consequences, but also very real effects on both the forms of governance adopted by de facto states, and the day-to-day lives of the people living in them. Case studies analysed for this report include Somaliland, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Tamil Eelam, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Northern Cyprus. Additionally, Western Sahara, Kosovo and Taiwan are sometimes considered de facto states. De facto authorities have also been analysed at the sub-national level – including Puntland, Iraqi Kurdistan and Marib governorate in Yemen (Johnson and Smaker, 2014; Jüde, 2017; Jautz et al., 2022). In Syria, the governments of opposition-controlled areas have also been described as de facto entities, pointing to the unclear distinction between ‘rebel’ and ‘de facto state’ governance (see Beaujouan, 2021).