288 K. Henrard of rights as political rights secure equal access and recognition within its decision making and organisational structures.142 Hence, voting rights are qualified as keystone rights, as ‘essential prerequisite to the enjoyment of all other rights’143 and thus essential to secure a dignified life. 4.3 The Right to Have a Nationality and the Fight against Statelessness As the preceding analysis demonstrated, having a nationality still greatly matters as it is the gate to obtaining so-called keystone rights (the right to enter and reside and the right to vote), that in turn enable the effective realisation of one’s civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights. Put differently, nationality is the ‘bedrock for fulfilling and protecting our otherwise abstracted human rights’,144 thus providing a sense of security and belonging.145 Linking back to the historical account of the emergence of nationality: ‘in a world divided among exhaustive and mutually exclusive jurisdictions of sovereign states, it is axiomatic that every person ought to have a citizenship, that every person ought to belong to one state or another’.146 Conversely, persons that are stateless tend to be described as particularly vulnerable, since ‘being stateless renders one vulnerable to the non-observance of rights by state and other individuals’.147 Indeed, as was pointed out by Hanna Arendt: when stateless there is no political community willing and able to guarantee one’s rights.148 The severe predicament of stateless persons is also keenly understood by international human rights courts, where they equate being stateless with being deprived for all practical purposes of one’s rights.149 Consequently, it is not surprising that the fight against statelessness has early roots,150 and has been relentless. The two most prominent and interrelated strategies in international law to combat statelessness are on the one hand the realisation of the right to a nationality, and on the other countering arbitrary deprivations of 142 Bellamy (2008), pp. 598–590. Kesby (2012), p. 69. 144 Oman (2010), pp. 279–280. See also Shachar (2014); Brubaker (1992), p. 70. 145 Citizenship is said to have a crucial bearing on the basic goods and opportunities that shape life chances: Brubaker (1992), p. 24. 146 Brubaker (1992), p. 30. 147 Kesby (2012), p. 62. See also IACrtHR Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic (2005), Series C No. 130. 148 Arendt (1968), pp. 175–177. 149 See also IACrtHR Advisory Opinion on Naturalisation Law Costa Rica (1984) OC-4/84, para. 34. See also the judgement of IACrtHR Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic (2005), Series C No. 130, paras. 178–179 where the Court equates a denial of nationality with a denial of juridical personality, because it denies absolutely an individual’s condition of being a subject of rights and renders him vulnerable to non-observance of this rights by the state and other individuals. 150 Brubaker notes the first concerns about combating ‘statelessness’ already in the 17th–18th century, in the sense that states were concerned that no one would be left homeless, without protection, without rights of residence and support (Brubaker (1992), pp. 65–66). 143 123