274 K. Henrard bounded territorial jurisdictions, implying that the world’s population was divided into a set of bounded and mutually exclusive citizenries and—with the emergence of the institution of ‘nationality’—nationalities.23 On the basis of these foundational principles, the required centralisation took place from the 17th century onwards, and especially in the 18th and 19th century, first by absolute monarchs.24 Diener highlights in this respect that the foundations of the modern state were provided by the capacity to demarcate land and identify people as belonging to one state.25 The centralisation was further bolstered by the large scale capacity of taxation, and coercive control of their population through advanced bureaucracies. Interestingly, the control and repression that went hand in hand with this centralisation move was also used to nurture nationalism since the King proclaimed to act for the good of the nation. Put differently, through the construction of meaningful political communities, loyalty to the state was ensured and state power was consolidated.26 The idea of citizenship as reflecting loyalty, deep commitment and allegiance was thus clearly visible in relation to the emerging nation-state. Through the 17th–19th centuries a shift took place from loyalty to the King, to loyalty to the political community, the nation, especially with the rise of popular sovereignty (democracy).27 The 18th century enlightenment and the growing emphasis on rights, and particularly equality and equal rights, further shaped thinking in terms of citizenship as referring to equal citizens, as citizens entitled to equal rights.28 Actual nationality laws were codified for the first time in the early 19th century.29 The creation of the institution of nationality was triggered by the need to define one’s own, when states were recognized as bounded territories with sovereign powers in their respective territories and international law identified state responsibilities in relation to ‘one’s own’. States’ limited resources make it indeed increasingly important that persons are allocated to a particular territory and state, so that closure can be exercised in relation to the ‘others’—particularly the poor ‘others’,30 and the control of the flow of persons across state borders is ensured.31 23 Brubaker (1992), p. 22. This centralization was first realized by Spain, then by the UK and France. 25 Diener (2017), p. 44. 26 See also Habib (1975), p. 15. See also Barkey and Parikh (1991), p. 530: ‘The state gained power over the population through coercion but was then able to gain their consent as well by making them citizens entitled to certain rights from the state’. 27 Wimmer and Feinstein (2010) discuss this development as self-rule in the name of a nation of equal citizens, p. 764. 28 The American and French revolutions linked notions of popular sovereignty and fundamental rights, thus giving substance to the institution of citizenship: see also Brubaker (1992), pp. 36–39. 29 Brubaker (1992), pp. 35 et seq. 30 See also Brubaker (1992), p. 181. Interestingly this closure against migrant poor was already visible in 15th–16th century Germany but then at the level of the cities, at a time when the municipalities had high degree of autonomy and thus power (Brubaker (1992), pp. 64–65, 68: the responsibility for the poor only shifting to the state of Germany in the 19th century). 31 Brubaker (1992), pp. 25–27. 24 123