the poor to have control over land and other assets (Target 1.4); and to measure progress against many of the targets under Goals 3, 4 and Goal 5 on health, education and gender equality (Dahan & Gelb, 2015; Gelb & Diofasi Metz, 2018). Proof of legal identity is essential to ‘facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people’ (Target 10.7 under the goal to reduce inequalities within and between countries) (Long et al., 2017). There is scholarly agreement that undocumented nationals often face significant exclusion (Bhabha, 2011; Hunter, 2019). There is also evidence that expansion of social protection has increased the demand for and supply of identity documentation – and more rapidly than coercive measures (Breckenridge, 2014; Hunter & Brill, 2016; Gardner et al., 2017; Harbers, 2020; van der Straaten & Metz, 2019). Nonetheless, some argue that evidence of the broader development benefits of strengthened identification systems is inconclusive in practice, although ‘perhaps most clearly established in the realm of antipoverty cashtransfers’, making it challenging to balance the benefits and risks of new investments (Brewer et al., 2015, p. 7). Debra Ladner and colleagues, researching the question ‘does delivering legal identity improve the delivery of its associated social goods’, conclude that, ‘[i]n countries characterized by poor governance, weak institutions, and resource constraints, legal identity may make little practical difference without complementary reforms’ (Ladner et al., 2014, p. 73). In this, identification is like other efforts to strengthen state capacity: improvement of service delivery requires not just infrastructure of various types, but also the political will and systems of accountability to make it work effectively. Presentations of current identification initiatives in Africa often seem to claim that better identification will by itself facilitate access to social goods. The roll-out of digital ID in Benin is described as ensuring efficient delivery of social services, especially through reduction in fraud (Adjovi, 2019). Lesotho’s national identity and civil registry is said to enable civic and social empowerment, as well as to ‘make possible real and inclusive economic gains’ (Raboletsi, 2019). In Nigeria, it is asserted that ‘A well-developed digital identification program will help deliver the [government’s] development agenda, and provide for key government services, such as safety net, financial inclusion, security and agriculture.’ (Aziz, 2019). In Kenya, the World Bank supported the government’s decision to roll out a national biometric registration exercise, as the foundation of an ‘inclusive growth agenda … including better targeting of subsidies to small-scale farmers, government social protection programs, and e-medical services among several others’ (World Bank, 2019c). In Côte d’Ivoire, a new biometric national population register will, it is claimed, enhance child protection, public security, socio-economic planning, democracy, financial inclusion, and good governance generally (Diakalidia, 2019). A similar list is provided for Tanzania (Malibiche, 2018). For these benefits to be realised, however, there is need for greater clarity on what exactly it is that is being delivered through these programmes, and how they relate to the successful fulfilment of other state obligations. Legal identity (un)defined By contrast to the human rights framework on identity and birth registration for children, and the established protocols on civil registration more generally, there is no international legal framework governing the right to an identity or to be issued official documentation later in life. 4