acknowledges, subject to geopolitical fluctuations. Instead of relying on UNRWA’s existing Advisory Commission composed of 28 member states, the review suggests transitioning to an executive board made up of 36 member states, to seek further funding at more senior levels and relocating the entity from Geneva to New York. 24 In practice, this scenario preserves and deepens the same donor-driven, voluntary, and politically contingent funding structure that has contributed to UNRWA’s ongoing funding crisis. Introducing an Executive Board structure, like that of United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Population Fund and United Nations Office for Project Services, would fundamentally change this dynamic by shifting authority from an advisory role to a governance model where a rotating group of states could exercise direct control over UNRWA’s strategy, operations, and budget - as decreed by the UNGA Resolution 48/162 of 1993 for the respective UN agencies.25 This scenario frames collapse as reform: UNRWA continues to exist, but in a form that is compliant, donor-governed, and stripped of its political autonomy. It institutionalizes even deeper conditionality and reinforces the same donor-driven system that enables certain member states to dictate the terms of support. This entrenches the voluntary funding model and empowers states most invested in preventing the international will to uphold the rights of Palestinian refugees and UNRWA itself. Far from rescuing UNRWA, this pathway turns it into a humanitarian subcontractor, a mechanism to contain and manage Palestinian displacement. Further restructuring constitutes a retreat from the UNGA’s and CommissionerGeneral of UNRWA’s exclusive authority over a subsidiary organ, 24 Ibid., 22 25 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Executive Board, accessed August 1, 2025, https:// www.unfpa.org/session-and-informals/executive-board-undp-unfpa-and-unops-annualsession-2025. 10