Citizenship Deprivation under the European Convention-System Proportionality, evidently, also entails that a balance must be struck between the general interest, the prevention or countering of terrorism and the individual’s interests. 130 In this regard, the lapse of time between the deprivation measure and the conferral or acquiring of citizenship is important. 131 The consequences on one’s private and family life will be greater when a person has lived there for 15 years, rather than those who have lived there for three. How this time limit is determined is unclear, as no advice has been given by the ECtHR on its determination. However, the effective community ties doctrine from Biao v Denmark might overcome this problem of proportionality altogether. 132 This is because the relevant matter at stake here, is that consideration should be given to people who have lived in a certain country for many years and have built strong ties with its community. If countries would grant protection to this category of nationals, instead of ‘nationals born as nationals’ (who may very well fall under the first category as well, granted they possess effective community ties), this particular issue of proportionality would dissolve. To conclude, in light of the ECtHR jurisprudence, the difference installed between children born Belgian and those who became Belgian, because of the status of their parents, seems difficult to maintain. CONCLUSION Citizenship deprivation is increasingly being used as a security tool. From recent legislative initiatives, such as in Belgium, we learn that denationalisation legislation is strengthened in order ‘to fight more effectively against terrorism’.133 This article considered the impact on the fundamental rights of the individuals targeted by such legislation. What protection is offered for them by the ECHR system? The ECtHR evaluates the issue of citizenship deprivation under art 8 of the ECHR. As was demonstrated by the judgment of Ramadan, the Court considers art 8 to be mainly a protection against expulsion. 134 When expulsion is off the table, as was the case in Ramadan, the Court does not seem to have an issue with citizenship deprivation (even if this leads to statelessness). 135 In other words, the examination of the impact of the decision on the right to private and family life only happens when a subsequent expulsion decision is taken, as was the case in the decision of Said Abdul Salam Mubarak. 136 At such a point, the ties the individual possesses with the community in question, as well as their country of origin, are weighed in the proportionality test. 137 However, such case law ignores the impact of citizenship deprivation on a person’s private life in the event that expulsion does not happen. Expulsion is only one consequence of the former, together with many other rights and benefits which are dependent on citizenship status. The Belgian situation demonstrates policy discrepancies, as it allows for 130 See, eg, Klass v Germany (1979) 2 EHRR 214, 237 [59]. 131 In its landmark Rottman ruling, the European Court of Justice stressed the importance of ‘the 132 133 134 135 136 137 lapse of time between the naturalization decision and withdrawal decision’: Rottman v Fraistaat Bayern (C-135/08) [2010] ECR 1467, 1490 [56]. Biao (n 99) 45–6 [138]–140]. Act to Reinforce the Fight against Terrorism (n 5). Ramadan (n 11) 113 [56]. ibid. Said Abdul Salam Mubarak (n 15) 18–23. ibid 22 [78]. 281