small number of refugees, including 33 registered asylum-seekers as of July 2024, plus some other cross-border forcibly displaced persons.76 Montagnard asylum seekers from Vietnam have periodically fled into neighbouring Cambodia, especially between 2014 and 2017. Some were eventually recognized as refugees, and the UNHCR has facilitated thirdcountry resettlement. In 2014, Cambodia signed an agreement with Australia whereby it accepted refugees processed at the offshore processing facility on Nauru in return for more development assistance. By the time the agreement expired in 2018, only seven refugees had voluntarily relocated to Cambodia – some of them may have been stateless.77 Most subsequently left for third countries. Some of the refugees and forced migrants may be stateless, such as Rohingya from Myanmar, but publicly available information is limited. 4.4. Summary This mapping identified certain longterm resident populations of Vietnamese descent as being stateless or most at risk of statelessness. Most are not recognised as nationals by Cambodia nor Vietnam and may in fact have never possessed proof of nationality in their lives ever since the modern, independent Cambodian state came into existence. They are managed under Cambodia’s immigration framework as ‘immigrant aliens’, and their main proof of legal identity is currently provided through the Permanent Resident Card. These communities are distinct in their predicament from more contemporary migrants from Vietnam who are by and large Vietnamese nationals. Certain individuals or families among the Khmer Krom may also face risks of statelessness. While they are in public rhetoric recognised as Cambodian nationals, many frequently struggle to obtain proof of Cambodian nationality. If certain Khmer Krom individuals are denied such proof despite multiple attempts and over a prolonged period of time, their risks of becoming stateless may increase – more so if they do not hold Vietnamese nationality. Cambodia hosts a small number of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons, most from Asia, among whom we might find also stateless refugees. Other at-risk populations currently remain understudied. These may relate to situations of marriage migration, especially to East Asia and the children from these marriages, and human trafficking victims. For instance, the US Department of State reported that ‘stateless persons, namely in ethnic Vietnamese communities, are at higher risk of trafficking due to lack of identity documentation necessary for access to formal employment, education, marriage registration, the court system, or the right to own land’.78 76 See more at Gleeson, Madeline (2012) ‘State of Migration: An Overview of Forced Displacement in Cambodia’, Phnom Penh: Jesuit Refugee Service Cambodia. <https://jrscambodia.org/publication/ State_of_Migration.pdf> (11 July 2024) 77 Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law (2019) ‘The Australia-Cambodia Refugee Deal’, Research Brief. <https://www.unsw.edu.au/content/dam/pdfs/unsw-adobe-websites/kaldor-centre/2023-09research-briefs/2023-09-Research-Brief_Cambodia_Oct2019.pdf> (12 July 2024) 78 US Department of State (2024) ‘2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Cambodia’. <https://kh.usembassy. gov/2024-trafficking-in-persons-report-cambodia/> (12 July 2024) 22