38.2 (7) TEMPROSA.DOCX38.2 (7) TEMPROSA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 254 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1/16/2021 12:59 PM [Vol. 38:2 renounced the protection of their nationality for valid reasons (de facto stateless persons) the benefits of the Convention. 72 At the heart of the 1954 Statelessness Convention is the definition in Article 1(1), which embraces an essentialist and deductive approach to defining the term "stateless person." Definitions are among the most basic concerns of international law. 73 In language, definitions can either be essentialist or polythetic as well as deductive or inductive. 74 Essentialist definitions identify the elements necessary for something to be designated as such. 75 By contrast, polythetic definitions do not require all things falling within a definition to have specific common elements. 76 In a famous illustration, philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein explained that the word "game" does not point to what all games have in common, but allows us to identify things that bear "family resemblances." 77 Deductive definitions articulate a general concept with reference to certain criteria, which identify activities associated with that concept. 78 The definition of statelessness is essentialist because it has two constituent elements that tell us when someone is stateless: (1) "not considered as a national… under the operation of its law;" and (2) "by any State." 79 The two elements must be present. It is deductive in that we refer to the elements as criteria to know whether a person is stateless or not. The State's vision of statelessness is the converse of citizenship, the latter being understood in the traditional sense as the possession of the formal status of membership of a political and legal entity. 80 If one is not formally a member of the entity, then they are stateless. Thus, international law has adopted a dichotomous vision of citizenship in relation to statelessness: either one is a citizen or not of any State. States that ratified or acceded to the 1954 Statelessness Convention are parties to the treaty that accept this definition of statelessness. The treaty prohibits 72. Edwards & van Waas, supra note 30, at 291–92; Cordova argued that “de facto statelessness is much worse than de jure statelessness not only quantitatively but also qualitatively.” 73. See, e.g., Ben Golder & Williams George, What is 'Terrorism'? Problems of Legal Definition, 27 U.N.S.W.L.J. 270 (2004); T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of 'Religion' in International Law, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189, 194 (2003); Steven R. Ratner, Self Defense Against Terrorists: The Meaning of Armed Attack (Public Law And Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 270, (2012)). 74. Gunn, supra note 73, at 194. 75. Id. 76. Id. 77. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 15 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 3rd ed. 1968). 78. Golder & George, supra note 73, at 273, 286 (as Golden and George explain, deductive and inductive approaches may also be combined within a single definition). 79. UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROTECTION OF STATELESS PERSONS 11 (2014) [hereinafter "UNHCR, HANDBOOK"]. 80. See Richard Bellamy, Introduction: The Theories and Practices of Citizenship, in CITIZENSHIP: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1, 2 (Richard Bellamy & Madeleine Kennedy-Macfoy ed., 2014).