#1 are often being challenged in court and are thus pending. In the table above we have compiled the figures for the “most affected” European countries, which accounted together for more than 95 percent of the European foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. To collect these figures, we have contacted experts in each country with a short questionnaire, and we cross-checked their responses with open-source documents and press articles, as well as with officials from international NGOs active in the Kurdish camps. To the extent possible, we limited our figures to European “nationals” (thus with citizenship), thus eligible for repatriation. Indeed, most European countries monitor a large number of FTFs that have “links” with their homeland, but do not have a European citizenship (e.g. legal or illegal residents). While the figures above should be treated with caution, they offer the best EUwide estimate available to our knowledge. EUROPE’S POLICY OPTIONS One year after the Turkish offensive, in spite of the deteriorating security and humanitarian conditions in the camps and detention facilities, all European governments remain hostile to the repatriation of their nationals from Syria. They consider a policy of repatriation as “political suicide”, 65 and the issue has indeed triggered the fall of the government in Norway and political backlash against Finland’s pro-repatriation Foreign Minister.66 Although most governments emphasise the right of children to return, they have been mostly unwilling to repatriate the remaining 600+ children detained in Syria so far, except in the few cases mentioned above. In spite of some Court decisions (in Belgium, Netherlands or Germany, notably) demanding the repatriation of children,67 often along with their mothers, governments have categorically refused to repatriate adults – except on three occasions mentioned previously. Governments have usually argued that Kurdish authorities refuse to allow the repatriation of children without their mothers, hence leading to a deadlock. Meanwhile, in some countries, Court decisions have been overruled in Appeal, consolidating the governments’ position that there is no strict obligation to organise the repatriation of ISIS families. Some of these cases will still likely be taken to Supreme Court or to the European Court of Human Rights. In quite a radical move, some countries have stripped some of their nationals in Syria of their citizenship, with the consequence of avoiding any obligation of repatriation, and with a potential impact on their children’s capacity to claim European citizenship (when born in Syria). The best-known case was that of Shamina Begum in the UK, whose citizenship was revoked in 2019, although the UK Court of Appeal eventually ruled in July 2020 that she should be allowed to return home in order to fully and effectively appeal against her citizenship deprivation.68 Other countries that have stripped some of their fighters of citizenship include Belgium, France, Denmark and the Netherlands. If repatriation is excluded, at least for adults, the question remains as to what should be done with detained foreign fighters in Syria. Indeed, prolonged detention outside any legal framework (creating a sort of “European-sponsored Guantanamo”) cannot be considered an option. Most European governments have generally adopted the position that foreign fighters should be prosecuted “where they have committed their offences”, thus implying either in Syria or Iraq. 69 The option of setting up an “international tribunal” was explored on several occasions since 2018, notably pushed by Sweden and the Netherlands, but it has been largely recognised as impractical. It would be costly and lengthy to set EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 6