20 attorney’s fee motions was that court’s opinion of October 19, 2017.4 Moreover, underscoring that Petitioners’ time for filing ran from the date of the judgment—and not the date the mandate issued—the rule governing attorney’s fees provided for appointed representation of indigent criminal appellants provides that such requests must be filed no later “than 30 days after the issuance of the mandate.” ARK. SUP. CT. R. 6–6(d) (emphasis added), as opposed to Rule 54(e)’s reference to “the judgment.” Therefore, if Petitioners were required to file their motion for appellate fees in the Arkansas Supreme Court, and—as Petitioners concede—Rule 54(e) governed the time period for filing that motion, Petitioners’ motion was due no later than November 2, 2017, fourteen days after the issuance of the court’s opinion. Yet Petitioners’ motion was not filed until November 21, 2017—33 days after the issuance of the opinion. Thus, Petitioners’ motion was untimely, and Petitioners have forfeited any ability to seek appellate fees under state law. The Arkansas Supreme Court was consequently within its authority to deny Petitioners’ motion without comment. See Norman, 66 S.W.3d at 640. 4 This Court similarly characterized its earlier opinion in this case as reversing “[t]he judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court. . . .” Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) (emphasis added); see also Pet. App. 13a (Arkansas Supreme Court describing this Court as having “reversed” that court’s “judgment”).