61 Fortify Rights received reports of authorities extorting money or in-kind materials even from Rohingya with NVCs each time they passed through checkpoints.212 Another Rohingya business owner, 52, with shops that sell and trade bamboo and other small ventures told Fortify Rights how the authorities coerced him to accept the NVC in February 2015 to maintain his business in Maungdaw Township: A higher-level government official, who was one of my business stakeholders, forced me to accept the NVC. Many officers in different departments in Maungdaw Township told me to accept the NVC. I would usually meet them regarding the business I was running. I am not happy about accepting the NVC. I am the only one from my family who accepted the NVC, and it was just to protect my business.213 MASS ATROCITY CRIMES AND NATIONAL VERIFICATION CARDS In October 2016 and August 2017, the Myanmar Army led mass-scale attacks on Rohingya civilians in response to militant attacks that reportedly killed nine and 12 officials, respectively.214 Myanmar Army soldiers, police, and civilian perpetrators massacred thousands of Rohingya in the first few weeks alone, raped untold women and girls, and razed hundreds of villages, displacing nearly 800,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh.215 Similar state-sanctioned targeted violence against Rohingya and other Muslims occurred in 2012 in 13 of 17 townships in Rakhine State, forcibly displacing more than 140,000 civilians, mostly Rohingya, many of whom were subsequently confined to internment camps, where they remain today.216 In the weeks and months prior to Myanmar Army-led attacks in 2016 and 2017, Fortify Rights documented an uptick in Myanmar authorities’ efforts to coerce or force Rohingya to accept NVCs. Evidence suggests a positive correlation between Myanmar authorities’ efforts to force Rohingya to accept NVCs and their efforts to destroy the Rohingya as a group. These findings demonstrate that the NVC process has not been a response to the crisis in Rakhine State, as the government suggests, but rather a fundamental part of the crisis. For example, Fortify Rights documented how Myanmar authorities ordered Rohingya village heads—yar ein hmu or “persons-in-charge”—and religious leaders in Rakhine State to accept NVCs in the weeks and months prior to attacks. A Rohingya yar ein hmu in Ta Man Thar village, also known as Shaab Bazaar village, in Maungdaw Township told Fortify Rights how authorities came to his village multiple times in 2016 ahead of the military-led attacks on Rohingya households in October, pressuring leaders to accept the NVC. He said: The immigration officers said, “If you take [the NVC], it will solve all the problems.” As a Rohingya leader, I refused. They said the same thing about the White Card and that was not true. It’s the same with the NVC. It does not give us rights . . . Once a month, there was a meeting with district administrators and township administrators. Many were Rakhine and many people from the government, including others like police and immigration, would come to the meetings.217 212 Fortify Rights interview with D.B., Maungdaw Township, Rakhine State, Myanmar, March 9, 2019. Fortify Rights interview with J.S.S., location undisclosed, December 13, 2018. 213 Fortify Rights interview with A.D., Cox’s Bazar District, Bangladesh, November 6, 2018. 214 Fortify Rights, “They Gave Them Long Swords.” 215 Ibid. 216 Human Rights Watch, “All You Can Do Is Pray.” At the time of writing, the government is confining more than 128,000 Rohingya to 24 internment camps in five townships of Rakhine State. 217 Fortify Rights interview with F.G., Cox’s Bazar District, Bangladesh, June 17, 2019. See also, Natalie Brinham, “‘Genocide cards”: Rohingya Refugees on Why They Risked Their Lives to Refuse ID Cards,” Open Democracy, October 21, 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/genocide-cards-why-rohingya-refugees-are-resisting-idcards/ (accessed August 23, 2019).