ship, the Israeli government was under pressure—especially from stateless Jews and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Interior—to create its own national citizenship. In a commonsense manner, the Ministry of Justice began preparing a citizenship bill soon after the establishment of the state of Israel. A draft of the bill was first brought for discussions in the government in November 1948.72 These discussions halted, however, until after the first elections before resuming in April 1949. By then, ten different drafts had been prepared by the Ministry of Justice.73 Yet Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, insisted on raising a principal question: is there really a need for a citizenship law? He fiercely opposed the idea that Palestinians should have any right to citizenship. Speaking to his party, Mapai, he said: “These Arabs should not be living here. Anyone who thinks that the Arabs have the right to citizenship in the Jewish State is saying [in fact] that we should pack our bags and leave . . . We have no need of a law of citizenship [because civil rights for Arabs] undermine our moral right to this country.”74 Ben Gurion’s objection to the citizenship law was further informed by considerations of demography and territory. The following exchange between Ben Gurion and then Transportation Minister David Remez, illustrates his position: Ben Gurion: When you have a country in a stable condition, then the question of citizenship is a simple one. But here you are asking to make decisions about matters that we are not interested in finalizing. David Remez: Following your logic, let’s assume that the questions of borders and Arab refugees have been settled, but thirty years afterward we occupy an additional territory. What should we do then? Ben Gurion: In that case, the citizenship law will wait for another thirty years. We are in an unstable and changing situation, so why should we get ourselves into trouble by resolving this matter? I don’t understand the urgency.75 For Ben Gurion, territorial consolidation trumped considerations of demography. Once territory was secured, the status of Palestinians was a question that would remain open—in Ben Gurion’s vision, for decades if necessary. This line of reasoning guided his decision making. In May 1949, the cabinet discussed the hypothetical question of absorbing the Gaza Strip, which at 22 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3533490