Colonial Legacies in Syrian Nationality Law i. Those able to prove their residency prior to 1945 were recognised as Syrian nationals. ii. Those who attempted to prove their residency by providing documentation but failed to convince Syrian authorities were classified as Ajnabi — ‘foreigners’ in Arabic. They have been officially recorded in a civil register of foreigners and have been given a ‘red card’. 199 Holders of these cards are allowed ‘leave to remain’ in Syria but have no right to return if they leave the country for whatever reason. iii. Those who did not have any documentation, were absent, or refused to take part in the census were deemed Maktoumeen — ‘concealed’ in Arabic. They are undocumented residents who are not even considered as foreigners. Their personal data was not registered in any official record and they are considered as residing unlawfully in Syria. 200 Since both Ajnabi and Maktoumeen did not hold any other nationality than the Syrian one, they were consequently rendered stateless. As a result of this census, 120,000 Kurds — representing around 20% of the total Kurdish Syrian population — lost their citizenship. Although Syria is not a party to the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions, it has ratified many international human rights conventions that protect the right to a nationality and expressly prohibit deprivation of citizenship when it leads to statelessness. 201 Moreover, there were significant inconsistencies and irregularities in the implementation of the 1962 census, making it a highly arbitrary process. 202 First of all, it was carried out during a brief period of 24 hours only, which left no time to the inhabitants of the AlHasaka province to collect the necessary documents, or even to understand what was happening, and the process automatically excluded people who were not present on the relevant day. 203 According to a Syrian lawyer, ‘thousands of people went to sleep as Syrians and woke up to find that they no longer were [citizens]’. 204 Because the census was carried out during one single day, testimonies argue that decisions of registration were rushed and deficient, and designed to deprive a large minority of their political weight in the new-born state. 205 Furthermore, the decree only left three months to appeal the decision of revoking Syrian citizenship. 206 Zahra Albarazi posits that, given the ‘deficiency’ of the government and of judicial institutions at the time, it was arduous to lodge an appeal and seek justice in any effective way. 207 One Kurdish Syrian, deprived of his citizenship during the census explained how he tried to restore his citizenship by lodging numerous requests respectively in 1970, 1980 and 1988 before Syrian authorities. His demands were dismissed each time on the ground that ‘he is from the people of Al-Hasaka governorate’. 208 Therefore, this example illustrates how Syrian 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 ibid. ibid. That includes UDHR (n 6) art 15. Albarazi (n 10) 8. ‘Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria’, Human Rights Watch (online, 26 November 2009) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/11/26/group-denial/repressionkurdish-political-and-cultural-rights-syria> (‘Repression in Syria’). ibid. Albarazi (n 10) 10. ibid. Repression in Syria (n 203). Manaa (n 62). 27