A Teleological and Child-Sensitive Interpretation demonstrate residence of some duration as well as a level of attachment in the concerned territory. From this baseline a broader band of indicia inform the notion, depicted in terms of the character and durability of ties in the country. Rigid adherence to this baseline interpretation prevents a stateless child born outside the country of nationality or former habitual residence of their parent(s) from satisfying the definition and predominantly reflects adult-centric experiences, with the exception of a stateless child who might be born in the country of reference prior to their arrival in the country of refuge. From this underbelly of inequity, a teleological perspective beckons. As emphasised by Foster and Lambert, the Refugee Convention’s humanitarian purpose, and the tug of a live protection issue embedded in the discriminatory nexus, may well signify a country of former habitual residence for stateless children born outside their parent(s) country of nationality or former habitual residence — in such circumstances where that country is ‘the centre of [a child’s] interests’, notwithstanding that they have not resided there. 106 It is prescient to keep the definition’s rationale front and centre — as the drafters made plain, their intention that individuals without a nationality would, in accordance with the principle of equality of status, maintain a foothold to a claim for refugee protection with a country of former habitual residence serving as their country of reference. Fundamentally, where a claimant — a stateless minor born outside their parent(s) country of nationality or country of former habitual residence who has not resided in the designated country — asserts an unwillingness to access the protection of that designated country (an unwillingness embedded in discrimination and a real chance of serious harm), the definitional scope for the notion of that country of former habitual residence should not undermine the Refugee Convention’s protection purpose. Plainly, the indicium of having a residence of some duration in the country of former habitual residence is an ill-fit for children. In search of a better fit, this article next explores the question of what child-specific experiences might better inform the more broadly formulated ‘centre of [a child’s] interests’ definition. As can be expected, a purposive interpretation affords some leeway to imbue the notion of a country of former habitual residence with child-sensitive indicia to fairly apply the individualised refugee assessment to children born outside the country of nationality or former habitual residence of their parent(s). With this flexibility in mind, a child-sensitive lens is now employed in the analysis. VI A CHILD-SENSITIVE LENS It has long been recognised in refugee status determination that children may be imbued with the characteristics of their parents. They inherit entitlements and qualities from their parents, and agents of persecution also impute children with their parents’ characteristics, including their civil and political status. In view of this vicarious parent–child aspect, state parties have, incrementally, employed a childsensitive lens to substantive and procedural aspects of refugee status determination. However, with the exception of the thread of jurisprudence in Australia outlined previously, and now in New Zealand, there has been little engagement by state parties with regards to the question of how the unique characteristics of children, 106 Foster and Lambert (n 17) 136–37. 25