A Teleological and Child-Sensitive Interpretation Such oversights call for ‘a creative alignment’ between refugee law and ‘the fastevolving body of international law on the rights of the child’, so as to colour the meaning of a country of former habitual residence as an integral component of the refugee definition.65 Before doing so, and as a backdrop to inform this analysis, this article depicts the current state practice. III STATE PRACTICE In leading refugee status determination systems, a base ingredient for a country of former habitual residence is that a claimant has at least resided in the concerned country territory for ‘some standing or duration’, in order for that territory to be designated a substitute country of reference (as an alternative to a nationality) for stateless individuals.66 Overlaying this base denominator are further broad indicators as to the characterisation of time spent in a country — such as the degree of establishment, referred to as ‘durable ties’ 67 or as an individual’s ‘abode or the centre of his or her interests’.68 Such indicators depict the bond between individuals and the countries in which they have resided, signalling something more than simple residence in a territory. 69 There are several examples of such formulations in Commonwealth countries. The High Court of Australia has observed that a ‘broad factual inquiry’ is required when identifying a country of former habitual residence for the refugee inquiry, including ‘the actual and intended length of stay in a state, the purpose of the stay, the strength of ties to the state and to any other state (both in the past and currently), [and] the degree of assimilation into the state’.70 In New Zealand, the Refugee Status Appeals Authority (‘RSAA’)71 has found it sufficient to establish the fact that a claimant ‘has in fact taken up residence and lived in the country for a period which showed that the residence had become, and was likely to continue to be, habitual’. 72 In the Canadian case of GRF (Re),73 the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (‘IRB’) considered the question of whether a child could be conceived as having a former habitual residence in Lebanon, the country in which that child had been born but had only lived in for two months before departing. 74 In designating that country as a former habitual residence, the IRB reasoned that the fact of the child holding a Lebanese passport and having rights to enter and reside there reflected rights broadly comparable to that of a citizen.75 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 Pobjoy (n 38) 5. Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law (AW Sitthoff 1966) vol 1, 160; Refugee Appeal No 72635/01 (Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Chairperson Haines and Member Plunkett, 6 September 2002) 26–27 [116]. Nessa v Chief Adjudication Officer [1999] 1 WLR 1937, 1942. Refugee Appeal No 72635/01 (n 66) 27 [116]. Hathaway and Foster (n 23) 66–70; Refugee Appeal No 72635/01 (n 66) 26 [113]; Paripovic v Gonzales 418 F 3d 240, 245 (3rd Cir, 2005). Tahiri v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] HCA 61, 6 [16]. The predecessor to the Immigration and Protection Tribunal. Refugee Appeal No 72635/01 (n 66) [116]. GRF (Re) [2001] CRDD No 88. ibid 12. ibid 14. 17