European States’ Obligations to Repatriate the Children Detained in Camps in Northeast Syria prima facie, consider the children to be nationals,250 considering the particular circumstances in the detention camps that make it nearly impossible for detainees to provide evidence of nationality and the fact that prolonging an already lengthy process of repatriation would pose a critical threat to children’s right to life, security, and development.251 Accordingly, States must allow the children and their primary caregivers to provide witness testimony and various sources of documentary evidence to prove their nationality,252 including documents issued by ISIS or other non-state actors.253 European States, therefore, should not resort to DNA testing unless it is strictly necessary, for example if there is no other way to prove nationality. In cases where DNA testing is strictly necessary, European States should remove physical and practical barriers to access such testing 254 with the aim of ensuring the DNA test option is accessible for all children in the camps who claim the nationality of a European State. In particular, the DNA testing requirement should not be used as a pretext to hinder the repatriation of children. Finally, if implementing DNA testing, States should UNSC, “Resolution 2331 (2016) on Trafficking in Persons in Armed Conflicts”, S/RES/2331(2016), 20 December 2016, para. 3(b); CMW and CommRC, “Joint General Comment No. 4 (2017) of the CMW and No. 23 (2017) of the CRC on State Obligations Regarding the Human Rights of Children in the Context of International Migration in Countries of Origin, Transit, Destination and Return”, CMW/C/GC/4-CRC/C/GC/23, 16 November 2017, para. 22; UNCCT, “Handbook Children Affected by the Foreign-Fighter Phenomenon: Ensuring A Child Rights-Based Approach”, 2019, para. 99. 250 In its assessment, the First Instance Court in Brussels has taken into account the particularly difficult context in which Mrs. X finds herself (armed conflict, situation of detention in the camp) and the impossibility with which she is confronted to bring the elements of proof generally required to establish the link between her and, Y and Z (her children); and based on the factual elements the Court considered Y and Z prima facie Mrs X’s children, i.e. Belgian nationals. See: Ordonnance, 19/129/C (Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles, Section civile) 30 October 2019, Section 5, p. 13. 251 CRC, Article 6. See also: ECtHR, “Mennesson v. France”, Application No. 65192/11, 26 June 2014, para. 97, in which the ECtHR stated that children whose legal relationship with their parent is not established “face a worrying uncertainty as to the possibility of obtaining recognition of French nationality under Article 18 of the Civil Code [...] That uncertainty is liable to have negative repercussions on the definition of their personal identity.” 252 See, for example: Mr. Bernard De Vos and Mr. Vanobbergen Bruno, “Recommendations From the Children’s Rights Ombudspersons of Belgium to Deal with the Children Returning in Belgium from Jihadist Zones”, Kinderrechtencommissariaat and Délégué Général aux Droits de L'Enfant, p. 3: “[…] it is necessary that Belgium. […] grant systematic passes for all children. The issue about the identification of the Belgian nationality cannot be a brake to repatriate the children. And if a DNA test is necessary, it can be supported by a cluster of clues, collected over there (and maybe in Belgium) such as photos, videos, exchange of letters, special physical signs and other administrative documents. And it cannot be a financial barrier.” 253 UNCCT, “Handbook Children Affected by the Foreign-Fighter Phenomenon: Ensuring A Child RightsBased Approach”, 2019, para. 96. 254 Ibid, para. 104. 46