182 M. Ferrera nutshell, Bauböck’s proposal is that we need to ‘add stuff’ in the container, in order to make it more immediately recognizable and salient to individual citizens and more effective as a bonding mechanism. Two additions are, in particular, proposed by this author: a stronger social component (individual rights and levels of protection that apply universally) and ‘some duty’. EU citizenship is exclusively centered on rights: ‘a duty-free citizenship does not support a sense of solidarity and it makes citizens less keen to hold governments accountable’. I generally sympathize with this argument and welcome an open discussion on this topic. Before outlining an agenda for reform, we need, however, to better articulate the diagnosis and clearly identify the existing flaws of the EU citizenship construct – especially in its social dimension. With this aim in mind, I will start by briefly revisiting the key historical steps and elements of national and EU citizenship. I will then highlight the political shortcomings and perverse effects of the latter and single out the challenges that need to be addressed. The last sections will outline some modest proposals for ‘adding stuff’ to the EU citizenship container, making it more consequential and, hopefully, more capable of integrating and bonding. A bit of history Citizenship in the modern sense was born with the French Revolution. The Declaration of Human and Citizens’ Rights (1789) identified a series of ‘natural, sacred and inalienable’ rights based on the fact that men are born free and equal. The ‘political association’ is tasked with defending and safeguarding these rights. Thus the citoyen is not only the bearer of natural rights, but also of state-backed guarantees for the exercise of such rights. During the nineteenth century, the pre-eminent political association became the nation (the nation-state). Membership of this entity began to be called nationality. With the advent of mass democracy and the welfare state, ‘nationality’ became the first filter for the exercise of the rights of citizenship and, prior to that, for the very legitimacy of a person’s presence on the state territory. In the sense of ‘nationality’, citizenship assumed the role of ‘assigning people to states’,3 giving them the ‘right to have rights’4 and participation in collective decisions. 3 4 Brubaker, R. (1992), Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. According to Arendt’s famous formula. See Arendt, H. (1951), The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.