134 M. van den Brink addition to the Treaties was precisely because it was largely premised on free movement.1 In other words, also post-Dano free movement remains the core of EU citizenship; it is simply that the precise contours of this right have changed somewhat. The real discussion thus is about the precise scope of the freedom to move and, relatedly, the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. The Treaty provisions on free movement are of course indeterminate and their meaning far from evident. Indeed, as de Witte suggests, the decision demonstrates that free movement is not unlimited, but whether this is a problem is something people will reasonably disagree about. This is also recognized by de Witte, who acknowledges that not everyone shares his belief that Dano is unjust. Justice, free movement, disagreement, and authority But it is at this point that the real issue arises, namely, how, in the face of disagreement about justice, such contestation is to be settled? Through which political procedures do we want to resolve such disagreements? What is necessary, in other words, is to ‘complement one’s theory of rights with a theory of authority’.2 This issue has been largely ignored by most discussions of the recent social assistance case law. While not addressed explicitly, for de Witte the authority to settle such disputes is clearly to be given to the Court. This might be, as Bellamy in his reply submits, because de Witte’s argument ‘suggests that appropriate mechanisms do not exist for a constructive democratic dialogue that allows for a clear discussion of how we might balance reciprocity between citizenship regimes and reciprocity within them in an equitable and sustainable way’. However, while far from perfect, the EU has in fact adopted decision-­ making procedures that to the extent possible allow for such a dialogue. This dialogue, of course, takes place when the different institutions involved in the EU’s legislative process, in which the EU citizen is represented by the national governments as well as by the European Parliament, deliberate and decide. These institutions have also spoken on many of the questions under1 2 Everson, M. (1995), ‘The Legacy of the Market Citizen’, in J. Shaw & G. More (eds.), New legal dynamics of European Union, 73–90. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Waldron, J. (1998), ‘Participation: The Right of Rights’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series 98: 307, 322.