126 R. Bauböck either side of this divide are everywhere the same: young versus old, high versus low education, urban versus rural, and – less universally so – female versus male.1 Yet there is one further characteristic that tends to be overlooked and that is causally connected with political stances on free movement. Mobile citizens tend to vote for pro-European parties or policies and immobile ones for anti-European ones. One of the most striking charts published by the Financial Times after the Brexit vote shows a very strong positive correlation between the percentage of local residents who did not hold a passport in 2014 – and thus were unlikely to have travelled abroad – and the share of the Brexit vote.2 It seems we are witnessing a political revolt of immobile against mobile Europeans. This may seem an odd diagnosis given that EUROSTAT data show less than 4 per cent of EU citizens currently residing in another member state for more than 12 months. But, as Saara Koikkalainen argues in her contribution and as Ettore Recchi and Justyna Salamonska show in a recent survey in seven EU countries, the numbers of mobile populations are much larger if one counts those with some lifetime experience of intra-EU mobility and includes transnational cognitive and network mobility. The EUCROSS study finds 13 per cent who have lived for more than 3 months in another European state and slightly more than 50 per cent who communicate regularly with family and friends across European borders, who have visited another European country in the last 24 months or who watch TV in a language other than their native one or the official one of their country of residence.3 Theresa Kuhn has shown that such individual experiences of transnationalism shape positive attitudes towards European integration but that this effect is social stratified. Conversely, the absence of transnational activities is likely to lead to perceptions of negative externalities of intra-EU mobility and negative attitudes towards European integration.4 Traditional cleavages along class, religious or ethno-linguistic fault-lines divided the political spaces of nation-states into distinct segments who lived either in separate parts of the state territory or in separate life-worlds. These 1 2 3 4 The gender gap was especially dramatic in the recent Austrian presidential elections: On 22 May, 60 per cent of female voters cast their ballot for the left-liberal green candidate, while 60 per cent of males voted for the right wing populist one. John Burn-Murdoch in FT, 24 June 2016 (based on data from 382 voting areas), available at https://www.ft.com/ content/1ce1a720-ce94-3c32-a689-8d2356388a1f. Recchi, E. & J. Salámonska (2014), ‘Europe between mobility and sedentarism: Patterns of micro-transnationalism and their consequences for European integration’. Unpublished working paper. Kuhn, T. (2015), Experiencing European Integration: Transnational Lives and European Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.