In support of this latter provision, Cordova argued: (1) The special importance and the unique and vast scope of this article, as well as the main ideas on which it is based, have already been partly explained in [para.’s 35 – 37 quoted above]. (2) There are hundreds of thousands of individuals who, on political, economic or racial grounds, had to leave their country of origin of which they were nationals and which in turn, quite frequently, is unwilling to accept them again or to accord them the minimum protection to which they are entitled as human beings. These de facto stateless persons have sought refuge in foreign countries and have established there a residence which they perhaps intended to be temporary, or to which the local authorities may have refused a permanent character, but which may have become, in fact, permanent or, at best, indefinite. The recipient countries accepted them for humanitarian reasons and, faced with the dilemma of an inhuman refoulement or expulsion to another country (which is not always possible), have resigned themselves to allowing them to stay, postponing sine die the final settlement of the problem but always maintaining the threat of some drastic action concerning them. (3) If the legislation of the recipient countries happens to be based on the jus soli principle, the problem will ultimately be solved by the mere passage of time. The stateless persons will eventually die and their children will acquire the nationality of such countries by operation of the law. The situation is quite different in the case where the recipient country follows the jus sanguinis principle. In this case, the stateless person and his descendants may forever remain in this condition. (4) In both these cases resumed action should be taken because, in the first instance, at least one complete generation would have to pass before the problem is solved and, in the second one, it might never be solved unless the Convention on the Elimination of Future Statelessness is adopted by the States concerned. (5) The most practical and just solution would be the one suggested in this article, namely, to extend to de facto stateless persons the juridical remedies which have been proposed for de jure stateless persons, e.g. the granting of the restricted nationality envisaged in articles 1 and 2 of this Convention. The Commission voted against including de facto stateless persons after objections were expressed by one of its members, Mr. Lauterpacht, that the term “de facto statelessness” had never been clearly defined, that it would be very difficult in practice to make a clear distinction between de jure and de facto statelessness, that including de facto stateless persons “would impose upon States the duty and give them the right to decide that a person who was a national of State X was not really a national of that State”, and that States would accordingly be obliged to treat de facto stateless persons as assimilated in most respects to their own nationals.41 However, the Commission did retain many of Cordova’s proposals on present statelessness with respect to de jure stateless persons, including all of those mentioned above, i.e. that such persons should have the same rights as nationals of their State of residence except for political rights, that they should have the same rights to naturalization as aliens, and that their children should have the right to citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. But instead of assembling the proposals into a draft Convention or Protocol, the Commission stated that “though formulated in the form of articles, [the proposals] should merely be regarded as suggestions which Governments may wish to take into account when attempting a solution of this urgent problem.”42 41 42 Summary record of the 246th meeting of the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/SR.246, 1954, para. 18; Summary record of the 249th meeting of the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/SR.249, 1954, para.’s 15 – 17. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly covering the work of its sixth session, A/2693, 1954, p. 147, para. 36. 14