publication concerning citizenship and statelessness in the context of the disintegration of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY):181 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was characterized by a double level of citizenship, all former SFRY citizens were citizens of the Federal Republic and were also registered with a republican citizenship of one of the six SFRY Republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia). […] Each of these republics had its own record of nationality and everyone who was a national of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was also to be registered in the nationality books of one of the republics. This registration had no legal impact for the persons concerned in the sense that it did not necessarily reflect the republic in which one lived, voted, worked, went to school nor, in fact, where one was born. It was of so little significance to people that they moved freely back and forth between republics and rarely made an effort to change their republican nationality, although this could be easily done. Many did not even know in which register they were recorded. Thus, when the successor States chose to grant nationality based upon the list of names in the previous republican nationality register, the result had both positive and negative elements. The positive element to this approach is that in principle, no cases of de jure statelessness could occur as all persons were presumed to be registered in one of the republican nationality registers. The negative element to this approach, with serious repercussions for thousands of people, was that those who were not registered in the successor State in which they lived were made foreigners in that State overnight. This was true in cases of persons who were born on the territory of that State and had lived there all their lives. While in some cases procedures were introduced to mitigate these severe effects, for example through a right of option or through acceptance into citizenship for certain ethnic groups, these procedures were either limited in time or of assistance to particular ethnic groups only. […] The procedure used in determining the more “effective nationality” in cases of dual nationality can usefully be extrapolated for determination of the genuine and effective link in granting nationality following State dissolution. There are connecting factors which may indicate an individual has a closer connection to one particular State than to any other State. Inability to acquire nationality in that State will constitute significant hardship for that individual and for his or her family. Further, basing the grant of nationality upon the registration system of a dissolved State, which was of no consequence even within that State, does not seem sufficient ground for choosing the nationality register over the genuine and real ties an individual has established. Human rights principles may also be contravened if the de facto statelessness thereby created, is created in relation to minorities only on the State’s territory. Thus, while avoidance of de jure statelessness may comply with international legal principles in the narrow sense of the law, the creation of de facto statelessness does not address the underlying intent or purpose of the law that all persons should have an effective nationality, one which carries with it the usual attributes of nationality and is reflective of real, genuine, and effective links in daily life. In UNHCR’s view, therefore, permanent residents on a successor State’s territory at the point of the dissolution of the former SFRY might more understandably have been included in the initial body of citizens of that successor State. If, however, the successor States were unable to agree on this approach and were concerned that the use of different approaches might result in de jure statelessness, a right of option might have been employed to extend to those who had been granted nationality in a State in which they did not live the right to choose, rather, to have nationality in the State in which they did live. In this way, both de jure and de facto statelessness would have been avoided.182 In short, according to this approach, persons may become de facto stateless if, in the context of State succession, they are not granted the right to the nationality of the successor State 181 182 See also, for example, UNHCR, “Citizenship in the Context of the Dissolution of Czechoslovakia”, op. cit. UNHCR, “Citizenship and Prevention of Statelessness Linked to the Disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”, op. cit., pp. 2 - 5. 54