46 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 25(1) (a) (b) That, inconsistently with his duty of loyalty to the Contracting State, the person: (i) Has, in disregard of an express prohibition by the Contracting State rendered or continued to render services to, or received or continued to receive emoluments from, another State, or (ii) Has conducted himself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State; That the person has taken an oath, or made a formal declaration, of allegiance to another State, or given definite evidence of his determination to repudiate his allegiance to the Contracting State. As was already mentioned, the introductory part of Article 8(3) requires that the ground(s) submitted in the declaration exist in the national law at the time of accession. Thus, the scope of over-inclusive or vague declarations may be limited by the corresponding provisions existing in national law at the time of ratification. These limitations to the scope of declarations under Article 8(3) must also be read in conjunction with the general obligations under international law which states that declarations shall not be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, and that they shall not diminish the scope of protection afforded by the treaty.37 Mention should be made of the conclusions of a group of experts convened by the Office of the UNHCR in Tunis on 31 October and 1 November 2013 (Tunis Conclusions) on the interpretation of the Article 5-9 of the 1961 Convention. Of particular importance are the remarks on Article 8(3)(a)(ii) which shed some light on what can be understood as ‘conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State’ (Tunis Conclusions, para. 68): This exception to the basic rule establishes a very high threshold for deprivation of nationality resulting in statelessness. The ordinary meaning of the terms ‘seriously prejudicial’ and ‘vital interests’ indicate that the conduct covered by this exception must threaten the foundations and organization of the State whose nationality is at issue. The term ‘seriously prejudicial’ requires that the individuals concerned have the capacity to impact negatively the State. Similarly, ‘vital interests’ sets a considerably higher threshold than ‘national interests’. This interpretation is confirmed by the travaux préparatoires. The exception does not cover criminal offences of a general nature. On the other hand, acts of treason, espionage and – depending on their interpretation in domestic law – ‘terrorist acts’ may be considered to fall within the scope of this paragraph. Finally, the acts concerned must be inconsistent with the ‘duty of loyalty’ to the State of nationality and the exception therefore applies only to conduct which is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of that State, rather than those of other States with which it has friendly relations. The experience of some States indicates that governments do not gain from rendering individuals stateless through the application of this exception, in particular because it may be difficult in practice to expel the persons concerned. 37. F. Shqarri, ‘Reservations to Treaties, Prohibited Reservations and some Unsolved Issued Related to Them’, 6 Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences (2015), p. 100. Compare also, L. Lijnzaad, Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties: Ratify and Ruin? (Asser Institute, 1994), p. 419-424 and A. Pellet, ‘Reservations to treaties and the integrity of human rights’, in S. Sheeran and N. Rodley (eds.), Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Routledge, 2014), p. 323-338.