278 E. WEIZMAN 4. (Todorova 2021; Turner 2015); Weizman 2016 and (Wright 2018). 5. This process continues to take up new forms, for example through the ‘temporary order’ of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law – extended on a yearly basis since its emergence in 2003 – which bars Palestinians from the occupied territories married to (Palestinian) citizens from receiving permits to live in Israel, in addition to preventing their access to naturalisation processes on the basis of racial identity. 6. On the nature of citizenship granted to some Palestinians after the establishment of the State of Israel, see, inter alia, (Molavi 2013; Robinson 2013; Rouhana Nadim and SabbaghKhoury 2015; Sultany 2003). 7. For discussions on the nation state as a racial state, see Goldberg 2002 and (for particular focus on Israel) Lentin 2018. 8. Bishara explicitly refers here to ‘civil society’ and not to ‘citizenship’. But his rich scholarship indicates that the two are interlinked. 9. For discussions on citizenship in other settler colonial contexts, see, for example, (Ahluwalia 2001; Nijhawan, Winland and Wustenberg 2018; Rifkin 2014; Simpson 2014). 10. This might be due to financial means, having a passport that facilitates mobility more easily or benefits from the existence of family members with means or property who stay behind, together with the ability to visit and even return to the settler state. 11. (Todorova 2021; Turner 2015; Weizman 2016a; Wright 2018). 12. I refer here specifically to Memmi’s treatment of ‘refusal’ – that of refusing the colonial condition by either leaving or resisting – and not the vast literature on indigenous refusal. 13. See: (one state compaign), https://onestatecampaign.org/all/en-manifesto/; One State Foundation, https://onestatefoundation.org/what/; (The One State Declaration 2007), https://electronicintifada.net/content/one-state-declaration/793. 14. This is partly because several of these ‘calls’ are akin to a declaration of intent rather than a detailed plan of action. An exception is the ‘One Democratic State’ campaign that specifically refers to the idea that ‘The State will do everything in its power to restore to the refugees their private and communal property and/or compensate them.’ https://ones tatecampaign.org/all/en-manifesto/. 15. Todorova (2019) addresses this issue, arguing that the politics of vulnerability is a form of decolonial solidarity between Israeli Jews and Palestinians. I argue however, that while this is true, as long as vulnerability is a choice, as in the case of the Jewish Israelis – it actually further highlights, and actually sustains, the colonial lines of difference. 16. I would suggest thinking about the involvment of Jewish Israelis in ‘one state’ projects in this light. 17. Ehud Adiv, who joined the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) in the 1970s is perhaps an exception that proves the rule. However, in his support of global proletariat struggle he did not get to aim weapons at other Israelis. 18. There are a few exceptions to the rule, the best known of whom is Mordechai Vanunu, a nuclear technician who in 1985 revealed Israel’s nuclear programme. Abducted and arrested, he was imprisoned for 18 years and subsequently denied permission to leave Israel. 19. The principle of ‘nonviolence’ is clearly indicated on websites and social media profiles of organisations and individual activists. For examples see: https://boycottisrael.info/content/ points-unity; https://taayush.org/?page_id=61. See also (Owen 2020). 20. See Fanon on the colonial bourgeois (Fanon 2001 [1961], 23). 21. Shortly after publication Pollak was interrogated by the Israeli police for ‘inciting violence’. Acknowlegments The author would like to thank the reviewers as well as the editors of the special issue for commenting on several versions of this paper, particularly to Sharri Plonski for her patience and generosity. Special thanks to Eyal Clyne, whose original (unpublished) piece inspired this paper.