CCPR/C/130/D/2918/2016 Annex II Individual opinion of Committee member Hélène Tigroudja (concurring) 1. I fully share the conclusion reached by the majority of the Committee with regard to the violation of article 24 (3) of the Covenant by the State party. This decision is undoubtedly an important contribution to protection against statelessness, especially when children are concerned as in the present communication. 2. However, as rightly highlighted by my colleague Yadh Ben Achour in his concurring opinion (see para. 7), I regret that the majority did not elaborate on the other breaches of the Covenant caused by the situation of the author, and more precisely on article 16 (recognition of legal personality) and on article 7 (humane treatment) which are implicitly raised. 3. In paragraph 3.1 of the communication, the author claimed for a recognition of “the links between the right to acquire a nationality and an individual’s enjoyment of juridical personality and respect for human dignity”. Although the author has not formally based his claim on articles 7 and 16, this should have been thoroughly and carefully considered by the majority of the Committee. 4. Indeed, as recently affirmed by the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, “the right to nationality is a fundamental aspect of the dignity of the human person”. 1 In the same vein, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights – whose persuasive authority in this field is recognized in the UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 5 adopted in May 2020 – affirms that nationality is “an inherent right of all human beings”, as well as “the basic requirement for the exercise of political rights” and a key element for “the individual’s legal capacity”. 2 More critically, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pointed out in the Yean and Bosico Girls case that while persons without nationality are in a situation of extreme vulnerability, children are in an even more vulnerable situation. 3 Stateless children are placed in a “legal limbo” 4 in the sense that they “do not have a recognized juridical personality, because [they have] not established a juridical and political relationship with any State”.5 1 2 3 4 5 12 African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Penessis v. United Republic of Tanzania, application No. 013/2015, judgment of 28 November 2019, para. 87. See also African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Open Society Justice Initiative v. Côte d’Ivoire, petition No. 318/06, decision of 18–28 February 2015. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of 19 January 1984. Series A, No. 4, paras. 32–33. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 8 September 2005. Series C, No. 130, para. 134: “This Court has stated that the cases in which the victims of human rights violations are children are particularly serious. The prevalence of the child’s superior interest should be understood as the need to satisfy all the rights of the child, and this obliges the State and affects the interpretation of the other rights established in the Convention when the case refers to children. Moreover, the State must pay special attention to the needs and the rights of the alleged victims owing to their condition as girl children, who belong to a vulnerable group.” Ibid., para. 180. See also Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 28 August 2014. Series C, No. 282, para. 265 and f. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 8 September 2005. Series C, No. 130, para. 178. GE.21-00755