CCPR/C/130/D/2918/2016 advocacy of hatred. And if article 2, like article 20, indisputably forms part of the Covenant as a whole, why should it be treated differently from article 20? Slicing up the Covenant in this way is not acceptable. 6. As for the second rule established in the Committee’s Views concerning Poliakov v. Belarus, supposing that it is based on sound legal principles, which in my view is not the case, the rule is perfectly applicable in precisely the present case. The lack of diligence on the part of the legislature of the Netherlands, which was also implicitly noted by the Committee in its concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the Netherlands, was the direct and sole cause of the great harm suffered by the author. This harm is considerable, not only because of its impact on child rights but also because it has been exacerbated by the length of time involved. 7. The State party’s behaviour in the present case is of such gravity as to fall within the scope of article 16 of the Covenant, for it amounts almost to denial of recognition as a person before the law. Despite years of effort, the author’s mother has been unable to have his status changed from “unknown nationality” to “stateless” in order to enable him, as a child born in the Netherlands to a stateless mother, to enjoy the right to acquire a nationality. As for the author, he maintains that he has already spent years in legal limbo, isolated from society in the country of his birth, and in extremely harmful social conditions, on account of the State party’s approach to statelessness, residency rights and acquisition of nationality. 8. Consequently, in the present case, the State party’s failure to observe its obligations under article 2 (2) of the Covenant is the direct and proximate cause of a distinct violation of the Covenant. In my view, there is a significant difference between a claim made under article 2 (2), read in conjunction with article 24, and a claim made under article 24 alone. The first relates to the violation of article 24 but also emphasizes more specifically that the State party is directly culpable for the harm suffered by the author. 9. For these reasons, in my opinion, the claim made under article 2 (2) of the Covenant was admissible in the present case. GE.21-00755 11