Frost C  omparative Migration Studies (2024) 12:23 Page 6 of 18 Table 2 Forms of intentional ambiguity Law Divergent implementing measures New Unchanged New Unchanged Signaling Hidden Performative Persistent types, summarized in Table 2, highlight how intentional ambiguity relates to different forms of ambiguity in citizenship and migration policies in existing studies. For example, Oxana Shevel (2011) discusses a form of legal ambiguity in Russia, where the state uses vague wording in laws to satisfy different objectives and groups without solving the contradictions of existing nation-building discourses. This “purposefully ambiguous” approach is rooted in the phrasing of laws. Purposeful ambiguity can be similar to signaling intentional ambiguity if the vague wording in the law primarily satisfies one set of actors, and then policymakers satisfy another major set of actors through divergent implementing legislation. However, unlike purposeful ambiguity, the core source of ambiguity in intentional ambiguity is not the law’s content, but the disconnect between the law’s content and its implementation. In addition, Noora Lori (2019) emphasizes the ambiguous legal statuses that a state can create by not accepting a group as citizens yet. This “precarious citizenship” examines formal legal statuses that are ambiguous because they place a group between citizens and foreigners without knowing when that status will end. Thus, the ambiguity is not in the content of the law, but in the ambiguous status that the law creates. Intentionally ambiguous policies could be, but are not necessarily, a part of precarious citizenship. For example, they could be when such “in-between” groups lack access to passports, work, or education in law but have this access according to implementation orders. Further, Kelsey Norman (2020) examines state decisions to use “strategic indifference” to avoid direct engagement with migrant groups and instead allow international or domestic organizations to provide services to migrants. The absence of state policies and engagement can make it difficult to identify what access to rights and services migrants have, which generates policy ambiguities due to state inaction and inattention. Indifference in Norman’s “policy outputs” could be an example of hidden intentional ambiguity when a state does not issue a new law governing a right but does issue new divergent regulations. Likewise, indifference in Norman’s “policy outcomes” could overlap with performative intentional ambiguity if state officials adopted a new divergent law governing a group’s rights, but did not change its accompanying implementation (Norman, 2018). However, indifference cannot align with signaling intentional ambiguity because signaling involves state officials actively adopting a new law and regulations. Moreover, scholars who study the legal status of refugees or other migrants in a receiving state can provide diverse examples of implementation gaps, including, but not focused on, intentional ambiguity. For instance, Maja Janmyr (2016) elaborates the legal challenges Syrian refugees have faced in Lebanon. Some of the examples reflect compliance gaps between Lebanese state practices and international law, such as Lebanese violations of non-refoulement when authorities deport refugees to Syria (Janmyr, 2016, 62, 72). Others emphasize protection gaps, where the Lebanese state or international