426 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 40:401 literal interpretation of the refugee definition in art 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention, and, in particular, the presence of a semi-colon separating the conditions required to be satisfied by refugees with a nationality from those required to be satisfied by refugees without one. Dowsett J posited that ‘the definition is in two parts — that preceding the semicolon and that following it’,125 and hence reasoned that the inclusion of ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ in the first but not the second part meant that a stateless person who was simply unable to return to his or her country of former habitual residence could be a refugee.126 In Dowsett J’s opinion, this interpretation was supported by a view that stateless persons were in as much need of protection as refugees, and that ‘[t]he underlying humanitarian philosophy of the Convention is that displaced persons should be given an opportunity to rebuild their lives with a relative degree of security.’127 However, on appeal to the Full Federal Court, this position was not adopted. As Katz J explained there, ‘even giving the semicolon its full weight as a constructional aid, I take the view that, in accordance with accepted grammatical principles, the semi-colon does not do the work of dividing the definition into two independent parts’.128 Instead, the Court took the view that all applicants for refugee status — whether stateless or not — must establish that they ‘have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason.’129 This was based on a different literal reading — in particular, the presence of the words ‘such fear’ in the latter part of the definition130 — as well as the travaux préparatoires,131 and the approach adopted by foreign courts. 125 Ibid 361 [47]. 126 Ibid 357–8 [32]–[33], 362 [51]. 127 Ibid 371 [88]. 128 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Savvin (2000) 98 FCR 168, 185 [82]; see also at 186 [85]–[86]. 129 Ibid 170 [8] (Spender J). 130 Ibid 177–86 [46]–[86] (Katz J); see also at 169 [2], 169–70 [7] (Spender J), 170 [10] (Drummond J), although note Drummond J’s disagreement about the weight that should be given to punctuation in treaty interpretation at 173–4 [24]–[29]. 131 For a thorough discussion of the travaux on this issue see Guy Goodwin-Gill, ‘Stateless Persons and Protection under the 1951 Convention’ (Paper presented at the Symposium on Recent Developments in Immigration Law, Bar of Québec, 22 January 1993); Rishmawi (1997) 77 FCR 421.