AHMR African Human Mobilty Review - Volume 8 No 3, SEP-DEC 2022 countries had discriminatory nationality laws in effect during this time that denied women equal rights to retain their nationality upon marriage (to a foreign national), or to pass their nationality to their children.115 While the 1961 Convention recognises these situations, it gives states wide latitude to retain gender discriminatory laws. For example, in cases where nationality is lost due to marriage (or related change to personal status) the 1961 Convention does not prohibit such outcomes. Instead, article 5 of the 1961 Convention states that ‘such loss shall be conditional upon possession or acquisition of another nationality’. In cases where the mother is barred from passing her nationality to her children, the 1961 Convention provides nationality must be granted to the child. However, under article 3 this protection only applies if the child would otherwise be stateless, and it further stipulates this applies in cases of wedlock only. Thus, the Statelessness Conventions do not challenge the direct gender discrimination rooted in nationality laws that subsume women’s nationality rights under their husbands’. Notably, the 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (1957 Convention) did directly address the issue of nationality loss due to marriage. The 1957 Convention, articles 1 and 2, states that a woman's nationality should not be automatically affected by marriage to a foreign national, and acquisition or renunciation of a nationality by a husband must not prevent the wife's retention of her nationality.116 As noted above, these protections were further expanded and strengthened in article 9 of the widely ratified CEDAW treaty, expressly protecting women’s equal nationality rights both in marriage and in relation to any children.117 The consequences of a gender-blind international legal framework on refugees and statelessness are significant. As Edwards contends with reference to the 1951 Refugee Convention, failing to include sex and gender in the treaty ‘… established the masculine experience as the norm … and relegated women and women’s experiences to second-class status’.118 It is suggested here that the same assessment can be applied to the Statelessness Conventions. Undoubtedly, international human rights law, and the principle of gender equality, have advanced significantly since the Statelessness Conventions were enacted. The UNHCR confirms that the treaties ‘must be read and interpreted in light of developments in international law, in particular international human rights law’.119 Further, the principle of gender equality, as reflected in widely ratified international human rights treaties, must be taken into account.120 However, the fact remains that the Statelessness Conventions are, on their face, inadequate from a gender perspective. As Brennan cautions while noting the exclusion of gender in the Statelessness Conventions, ‘to uncritically celebrate the existence of these treaties 115 International Law Association op cit note 25 at 17, 25. Convention of the Nationality of Married Women 1957, 309 UNTS 65, Articles 1–2. See CEDAW, section III(a) at 15. Alice Edwards ‘Transitioning gender: Feminist engagement with international refugee law and policy 1950–2010’ (2010) 29(2) Refugee Survey Quarterly 21 at 23. 119 UNHCR ‘Guidelines on statelessness No. 4: Ensuring every child's right to acquire a nationality through Articles 1–4 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness’ (21 December 2012) HCR/GS/12/04 at para 8. 120 Ibid para 13. 116 117 118 32