2  Political and policy context Since August 2017, the national and international response to the situation in Rakhine State, Myanmar, has come under intense scrutiny. Following her mission in 2019, Yanghee Lee, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, concluded that ‘it is evident that Myanmar is not working to create conditions for return’ (OHCHR, 2019). Progress against key elements of the Rakhine Advisory Commission recommendations has been limited, and the prospect that conditions conducive to return can be established remains minimal. The challenges facing refugees who arrived in 2017 are familiar from previous refugee influxes. A review by UNHCR of its response to the caseload of refugees who fled Myanmar for Bangladesh in the 1970s and 1990s documents lack of legal status, tensions with host communities, protection risks, including gender-based violence, poor shelter, limited access to services and restrictions on the provision of support that could contribute to refugee selfreliance, namely freedom of movement, education and livelihoods (2011: 8–15). The same review noted that there were ‘relatively few options for UNHCR to pursue in Bangladesh. Resettlement has been stopped. Voluntary repatriation to Myanmar is currently not foreseeable. Local integration cannot be officially pursued. Self-reliance remains the only option, but without freedom of movement or the right to work, this remains an elusive quest’ (ibid: 23). The same could be said of the situation in Cox’s Bazar today. The speed of displacement and the rapid growth of camps in Bangladesh, the level of congestion, difficult topography and climatic risks, including monsoons and cyclones, have combined to create significant risks and challenges to accessing basic services for refugees (UNHCR, 2018b: 2–7), compounding the severe trauma experienced during flight. Camp congestion is a critical part of the government’s justification for the proposed relocation of 100,000 refugees to Bhashan Char, a silt island three hours off the coast of Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal. At the time of writing relocation was on hold pending a full assessment of conditions and the scope for the delivery of assistance, and clear and accurate information to allow refugees to make an informed decision over relocation. 8 While the 2018 JRP, developed in partnership with the Government of Bangladesh, included a focus on ‘Preparing for durable solutions in the short- and mid-term by promoting refugee self-reliance’ (OCHA, 2019b), the 2019 JRP reflects a much more limited policy and operational space, with fewer references to refugee livelihoods and none to formal education (UN, 2019). Regulations and procedures limit non-UN actors from delivering any assistance not considered ‘life-saving’ (UNHCR, 2018b). The government is alive to the risks associated with the presence of a large uneducated and unoccupied refugee population in Cox’s Bazar. Concerns around radicalisation, crime (including drugs) and negative coping strategies (including child labour, early marriage and human trafficking) are important themes in discussions of the crisis among senior government officials in Dhaka and affected communities in Cox’s Bazar, where the burden of hosting the refugees is being acutely felt. Cox’s Bazar is one of Bangladesh’s poorest districts, with approximately 33% of the population living below the poverty line (Lemma et al., 2018: 5). Service provision is limited. A survey of host communities found that, of those who reported being unhappy about the Rohingya presence, 72% said this was due to competition over services (ISCG, 2019: 27). While some in the host community and local officials recognise the potential to mitigate these concerns through the expansion of services such as education and livelihoods, national government policy remains opposed to medium-term programming. The government’s position is driven primarily by its desire to maintain national and international focus on return as the solution to the crisis, and hence on Myanmar’s responsibility to create conditions that allow this. The fact that the November 2018 repatriation attempt was unsuccessful refocused international attention on the conditions in Rakhine that continue to deny the opportunity for the Rohingya to return. Yet with return still the priority for the Government of Bangladesh, it is clear that dialogue on medium-term self-reliance initiatives in Cox’s Bazar will only be possible if they believe the international community remains similarly committed to return. As such, credible international pressure on Myanmar remains a prerequisite for steps to address conditions for the Rohingya in Bangladesh. Uncertain futures: Rohingya refugees’ perspectives on their displacement in Bangladesh