1  Introduction 1.1  Overview of the crisis In 2017, over 700,000 Rohingya fled from Myanmar to Bangladesh, joining hundreds of thousands who had already sought refuge there. Today, Bangladesh hosts over 900,000 Rohingya refugees (UN, 2019).1 A 2018 report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar established that crimes against humanity were committed in Rakhine State, and concluded that there is sufficient grounds to investigate and prosecute senior members of the Tatmadaw (the Myanmar army) for genocide (Human Rights Council, 2018). The 2019 Joint Response Plan (JRP) (UN, 2019) underlines that both the cause of and the solution to the Rohingya humanitarian crisis are ultimately to be found in Myanmar. This requires steps to address the historic discrimination faced by the Rohingya in Rakhine. It also calls for steps to address the root causes of the crisis through the implementation of the Rakhine Advisory Commission recommendations, as endorsed by the Myanmar Government, including removing restrictions on freedom of movement of the Rohingya and the creation of pathways to citizenship. However, progress on these steps remains limited and there is no indication that conditions conducive to refugee return will emerge in Rakhine State, at least in the medium term. This highlights the need for international and regional efforts to maintain assistance to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, alongside sustained attention on conditions in Myanmar and the promotion of measures to address the root causes of the crisis. In the meantime, nearly a million stateless2 refugees are living in limbo in Bangladesh in inhospitable areas prone to hazards and disasters. The displacement of so many people in such a short time has created the world’s largest and densest refugee camps, with population density as high as 8m2 per person (the minimum standard, according to international best practice, is 45m2 (OCHA, 2018: 13)). The Government of Bangladesh, with resources and support from local, national and international stakeholders (donors, multilateral banks, humanitarian organisations and others), has led the herculean effort to respond to the immense task of supporting the displaced Rohingya. These efforts have been commendable, not least as many countries, including wealthy ones, are stepping back from their obligations to protect people seeking safety from conflict and violence. However, the rights and freedoms of refugees are limited, the operational space for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is constrained and there are limits on forms of programming that could contribute to refugee selfreliance, such as education, livelihoods and cash. While conditions in the camps have stabilised, the severity of the crisis and the limits on humanitarian programming mean that activities remain to a large extent oriented towards meeting immediate needs. Displacement for newly arrived refugees is likely to be protracted (Wake and Yu, 2018). Indeed, refugees who arrived following the 2017 violence in Myanmar joined approximately 200,000 already living in protracted displacement in Bangladesh (UN, 2019: 10). The JRP for 2019 acknowledges that ‘sustained advocacy efforts are required to recognize the legal status of refugees in Bangladesh and address important protection issues, especially with regard to civil documentation, access to justice, the right to education and access to livelihood, while at the same time pursuing sustainable solutions’ (UN, 2019: 30). Regional experience of long-term encampment illustrates the imperative of securing 1 The Government of Bangladesh has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention. It uses the term ‘forcibly displaced Myanmar nationals’ to refer to the Rohingya, and some stakeholders involved in the response acquiesce to the use of such language. In this report, we refer to the Rohingya in Bangladesh as Rohingya refugees. This terminology is of great importance in describing the Rohingya, a stateless population who would clearly satisfy the criteria for refugee status under international law. 2 Most Rohingya who have fled Myanmar are also stateless, having been denied citizenship in Myanmar. As a result, voluntary return as a truly durable solution would need to be characterised by both the assurance that persecution of the Rohingya will end, as well as assurance of citizenship with appropriate rights and documentation. Based on the jus soli provision in the 1951 Citizenship Act of Bangladesh, everyone born in Bangladesh should automatically acquire citizenship at birth (Kiragu et al., 2011). However, Bangladesh refuses to allow the births of Rohingya babies in Bangladesh to be registered and they are denied their right to a nationality (de Chickera, 2018), rendering a new generation of Rohingya stateless. 4 Uncertain futures: Rohingya refugees’ perspectives on their displacement in Bangladesh