German Law Journal 1657 held during the pandemic, voters moved decisively away from far right-wing parties using populist rhetoric and engaging with misinformation about the pandemic.143 In France, however, research has shown that lower participation levels in municipal elections correlate with factors such as age, which is an important indicator of COVID-19 vulnerability.144 In other words, vulnerability to COVID-19 may increase abstentionism amongst voters. Of fundamental importance to the evolution of constitutionalism more generally are the effects of the pandemic on the legislative-executive-judicial balance and on the separation of powers.145 As Bonnie Honig reminds us, “Enacting or exacting accountability is one of the essential responsibilities of democratic citizenship.”146 In that respect, the COVID-19 crisis has clearly engendered significant challenges to both democratic principles and democratic performance.147 Certainly in the early days of the pandemic, decisions had to be taken in great haste and emergency powers were often invoked. One early assessment warned of a pandemic of authoritarianism as a result of the flood of emergency measures.148 Indeed, it is not difficult to mount an argument that excessive reliance upon executive action on the grounds that it is needed in an emergency may encourage further authoritarian responses and may lead to long term democratic degradation. It is unfortunate that this should occur at a moment when democracy seems already to be under significant threat in many countries in an age of populist politics.149 The pandemic has been described as an “inflection point” for democracies already under stress.150 Yet at the same time, as the rich country-based data gathered by several projects/observatories151 and the preliminary comparative research now available152 both highlight, it would be incorrect to generalize or to draw firm conclusions about what the implications of the pandemic for democracy might be, or whether it can be said that democracies or autocracies have performed better in relation to combatting the pandemic.153 The balance is changing over time, and also between countries. The evidence points in different directions and may be contradictory.154 Furthermore, it is not only the formal governmental institutions that are relevant here, but also the inputs of scientific experts155 and of non-governmental organizations and levels of trust in particular countries in both science and 143 Viennese Voters Turn Their Backs on Populist Freedom Party, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/ 96f211e4-3494-4e55-b124-98729c53c765. 144 Abdul Noury, Abel Francois, Oliver Gergaud & Alexandre Garel, How Does COVID-19 Affect Electoral Participation? Evidence from the French Municipal Elections, 16(2) PLOS ONE e0247026 (2021). 145 For examples of democratic and judicial oversight, as well as more problematic cases, see Alice Donald & Philip Leach, Human Rights and COVID-19: Forging Recovery After a Pandemic of Abuses?, VERFBLOG (Apr. 10, 2021), https:// verfassungsblog.de/human-rights-and-covid-19-forging-recovery-after-a-pandemic-of-abuses/. 146 BONNIE HONIG, EMERGENCY POLITICS: PARADOX, LAW, DEMOCRACY, 69 (Princeton Univ. Press 2009). 147 Klaus H. Goetz & Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, COVID-19: A Dual Challenge to European Liberal Democracy, 44(5-6) W. EUR. POL. 1003 (2021). 148 Stephen Thomson & Eric C. Ip, COVID-19 Emergency Measures and the Impending Authoritarian Pandemic, 7(1) J.L. & BIOSCIS. (2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7543595/. 149 Autocratization Turns Viral: Democracy Report 2021, UNIV. GOTHENBURG V-DEM INST. (2001), https://www.v-dem.net/ files/25/DR%202021.pdf. 150 Amit Prakash, Shadow of the Pandemic and the Beleaguered Liberal-Democratic Script in India, 20:2 INDIA REV. 104 (2021). 151 See supra note 1. For executive accountability to parliament. See also UNIV. BIRMINGHAM, THE COVID-19 REVIEW OBSERVATORY, https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/artslaw/projects/cvro.aspx. See also other individual case studies, such as Jan Petrov, The COVID-19 Emergency in the Age of Executive Aggrandizement: What Role for Legislative and Judicial Checks?, 8:1-2 THEORY & PRACTICE LEGIS. 71 (2020). 152 For example, Maritza Lozano, Michael Atkinson, & Haizhen Mou, Democratic Accountability in Times of Crisis: Executive Power, Fiscal Policy and COVID-19, GOV’T & OPPOSITION (2021). 153 Tom Gerald Daly, Democracy and the Global Pandemic: Reshuffled Reputations and the Future of the “Free World,” VERFASSUNGSBLOG (May 1, 2021), https://verfassungsblog.de/democracy-and-the-global-pandemic/. 154 Afsoun Afsahi, Emily Beausoleil, Rikki Dean & Selen A. Ercan, Democracy in a Global Emergency, 7(2) DEMOCRATIC THEORY (2020). 155 Andrea Lavazza & Mirko Farina, The Role of Experts in the Covid-19 Pandemic and the Limits of Their Epistemic Authority in Democracy, FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH 8 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2021.77 Published online by Cambridge University Press