36 AUAD v. BULGARIA JUDGMENT fears, which were plainly arguable in the light of the opinion delivered by the State Refugees Agency (see paragraph 11 above). The Court will revert to this matter in the context of Articles 13 and 46 (see paragraphs 121 and 139 below). In the light of the domestic court’s failings, it falls to the Court to assess the question of risk with reference to the above-mentioned principles. 102. When considering that question on 29 October 2009, the State Refugees Agency was satisfied that there existed substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk that the applicant would face ill-treatment or death in Lebanon, and granted him humanitarian protection, based, firstly, on his particular circumstances and, secondly, on the general situation in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. Its decision mainly relied on the fact that the applicant had been a member of Fatah and had been personally engaged in a violent conflict with members of a militant group (Jund al-Sham) operating in the Palestinian refugee camp (Ain al-Hilweh) where he had lived (see paragraph 11 above). Those findings carry significant weight, for two reasons. First, that Agency is a specialised body with particular expertise in this domain. Secondly, its officers were able to conduct a personal interview with the applicant. They had an opportunity to see, hear and assess his demeanour, and were thus in a position to test the credibility of his fears and the veracity of his account (see, mutatis mutandis, Ahmed v. Austria, 17 December 1996, § 42, Reports 1996-VI; Jabari v. Turkey, no. 40035/98, § 41, ECHR 2000-VIII; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, no. 30471/08, §§ 82-83, 22 September 2009; and R.C. v. Sweden, no. 41827/07, § 52, 9 March 2010). 103. Moreover, this evidence cannot be considered in isolation. Instead, it must be assessed against the background of the available information on the situation in Lebanon and that of the Palestinian refugees there. It is true that the situation in the country as a whole does not appear so serious that the return of the applicant there would constitute, in itself, a breach of Article 3 (see paragraph 58 above). However, it cannot be overlooked that the applicant is a stateless Palestinian originating from a refugee camp in Lebanon (see paragraphs 1 and 7 above). There is therefore a likelihood that he would not be allowed to reside in Lebanon proper, but would have to return to the camp from which he fled, Ain al-Hilweh. The information available on the Palestinian refugee camps in general and Ain al-Hilweh in particular (see paragraphs 52-55, 60, 62, 65-73, 77, 78, 80 and 82-88 above) shows that they are not under the control of the Lebanese authorities, but of various Palestinian armed factions. They are secluded from the rest of the country, are often surrounded by Lebanese army checkpoints, and have been described in reports as “beyond the [S]tate’s reach”, “de facto sanctuaries for weapons” and “a safe heaven for those who seek to escape the authority of the State”. They continue to be plagued by outbursts of violence and armed clashes between various factions. Ain al-Hilweh, which is very