The Meaning of ‘Life’ under the Indian Constitution not to render persons stateless means that states are to ensure as a general rule that no state action leaves persons stateless unless such state action is in line with the above exceptions, passes the test of proportionality and is for a legitimate purpose. III THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND THE OBLIGATION NOT TO RENDER PERSONS STATELESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW As explained in the previous section, states have an international obligation not to render persons stateless, leaving them in a situation where they have lost their membership in the state, do not have access to human rights and are forced to live without human dignity. Given that this obligation arises from international law, this section explores if international law provides a basis for examining this obligation through the lens of ‘life’. The right to life in art 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) includes the right against ‘unnatural or premature death’ and the right to live with dignity. 51 The Human Rights Committee, expanding on the dignity aspect of the right to life under art 6 of the ICCPR, explains that states have to take steps to address conditions in society that may threaten life including life-threatening diseases, extreme poverty and homelessness, and notes that states should take measures to address access to essential goods and health care. 52 Regional and national courts have also interpreted the dignity aspect of the right to life to ensure socio-economic rights. 53 Although this link between the right to life and dignity has not been indicated in the context of statelessness, some of the measures that states are required to take pursuant to the right of persons to live with dignity are the rights that are denied or are inaccessible to persons without a nationality. 54 This indicates that there could be a connection drawn between enjoyment of human rights and the right to life. Since the enjoyment of the former requires the right to nationality, a connection can be teased out between the right to life and the right to nationality. In another sense, these measures relate to the protection of life on the basis of human dignity. The right to have rights is to ensure human dignity to the rightless. On the basis of this human dignity, the right to life could include the obligation not to render persons stateless. If not for this obligation, persons could be rendered stateless, kept from a dignified life without access to human rights and membership in a polity and this can affect the right to life. This shows that international law provides a basis for arguing that the right to life should include the obligation not to render persons stateless. Similar reasoning was made by the European Court of Human Rights when it drew inferences between the right to social life of individuals under art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, social identity and the right to nationality. The Court acknowledged the impact the denial of citizenship could 51 52 53 54 General Comment No 36, Art 6 (Right to Life), CCPR/C/GC/36 (3 September 2019) [3]. ibid [26]. Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’, (2008) 19(4) European Journal of International Law 655, 693; Elizabeth Wicks, ‘The Meaning of “Life”: Dignity and the Right to Life in International Human Rights Treaties’ (2012) 12(2) Human Rights Law Review 199, 219. Refer to Part 4(A). 193