2021 Statelessness & Citizenship Review 3(1) education, 91 the right to food, 92 the right against custodial violence 93 and the right to shelter. 94 These rights are the most basic of rights that any human being is presumed to possess on account of their humanity and human dignity, 95 the ‘bare necessaries of life’ and an arbitrary deprivation of any of these rights would result in a deprivation of the right to life. 96 From the above, two aspects are clear about the meaning of ‘life’ under art 21 — the first being that the right to life includes several rights that make up a dignified life and the second is that such dignified life is core to a human being’s ‘life’. Given the consequences of statelessness, that is loss of membership in the state and human dignity, it is difficult to imagine how a person’s ‘life’ in a situation of statelessness could be a dignified life as mandated by art 21 of the Constitution. The previous part described what ‘life’ is like in a situation of statelessness. A comparison of ‘life’ in such a context with ‘life’ as mandated under art 21 reveals that in a situation of statelessness, a person is exposed to human rights violations and is unable to enjoy basic human rights and live a dignified life under art 21. The NRC updating exercise itself illustrates the importance of a state for an individual to enjoy human rights. If a person is rendered stateless through the NRC exercise and if they do not have another nationality, they may be considered a foreigner and detained under the Foreigners Act, 1946 (‘FA 1946’). 97 Without diplomatic protection from any state, such detainees cannot be deported since they do not have a state and are vulnerable to human rights violations including indefinite detention which infringes art 21 of the Constitution. Having established that when ‘life’ under art 21 of the Constitution is contrasted with the reality of a person in a situation of statelessness, a stateless person does not experience a dignified life, this article now turns to whether ‘life’ under art 21 should include an obligation not to render persons stateless. If this is the case, then a state action that renders persons stateless would be in violation of art 21. At the outset, it is noted that the international obligation not to render persons stateless is applicable to India especially through the right to nationality, which is part of treaties that India is a party to, namely the ICCPR, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 98 Article 15 of the UDHR, as well as the different UN resolutions containing the obligation of states not to render persons stateless, apply to India. 99 Moreover, the obligation not to render persons stateless, as an emerging customary international law norm and as a general principle of law, is applicable to India. In any case, Indian courts have 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 Unni Krishnan, JP v State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 1 SCC 645 (Supreme Court of India) [166]. Shantistar Builders v Narayan Khimalal Totame (1990) 1 SCC 520 (Supreme Court of India) [9]. DK Basu v State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416 (Supreme Court of India) [22]. UP Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v Friends Coop. Housing Society Ltd (1995) Supp (3) SCC 456 (Supreme Court of India) [8]. Francis Coralie (n 78) [8]. ibid [7]–[8]. Foreigners Act, 1946, Act No 31 of 1946 (India) ss 2(a), 3. ICERD (n 16) art 5; CRC (n 16) art 7; CEDAW (n 16) art 9. Indian courts have often drawn obligations arising out of United Nations resolutions. See People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India (1996) Supp 10 SCR 321 (Supreme Court of India) [10] (Rajendra Babu J). 198