Water 2020, 12, 340 18 of 28 intra-state conflict to redress harm for victims whose health and livelihoods have been decimated by countless similar incidents. If UNSC vetoes can readily prevent crimes committed in Yemen and Syria—two of the most devastating humanitarian situations in the world today—from being brought to the ICC, then the ICC referral process is truly broken. The problem with reparations for victims of violations of the human right to water is multifold: (1) The nature of these violations must be more clearly defined in a treaty on the human right to water and protections for victims of crimes violating the human right to water, necessitating an unprecedented merging between IHL and international water law; (2) The process for securing reparations for victims of human rights violations must be repaired; a mechanism for bringing situations to the Court that is not at the total discretion of the UNSC (which allows permanent members discretionary veto power used for their own political advantage); (3) Within the existing process for establishing the need for reparations as defined in the Rome Statute, violations of the human right to water must be clearly defined as a crime with victims who are unquestionably protected under the Rome Statute. 7. Water and Armed Conflict in the MENA Region Existing literature on the human right to water in armed conflict (particularly literature on IS), repeatedly acknowledges the applicability of IHL, particularly the Geneva Conventions, to incidences of wartime manipulation of water resources [15,83,84]. However, the literature consistently falls short of extending this acknowledgement into critical analysis of the role of international law in scenarios where the human right to water during armed conflict has been clearly violated. As established, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions prohibits destruction of civilian water resources and infrastructure in international conflict [34]. In non-international conflict, all civilian objects are protected and deemed off-limits as military targets according to both the Geneva Conventions [35] and customary international humanitarian law. In 2005, the ICRC established that “these rules are equally binding in international and non-international armed conflicts . . . [and] are binding on all parties to the conflict, even those who have not or cannot sign the conventions, such as non-state armed groups” [85]. 7.1. The Role of Law: Deficiencies, Risks, and Potential Reform Regardless of standards set by IHL, civilians’ human rights to water are being trampled on in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria. With regard to Iraq and Syria, Lossow notes, “State actors and non-state actors alike are explicitly not complying with international law, norms and standards, preventing the civil population from receiving the most basic supplies of water, food and medical care” [83]. It is an important step to acknowledge the unprecedented extent to which civilian rights to water are being violated in the context of armed conflict. Existing literature on the rise of the weaponisation of water acknowledges that this development has legal ramifications, but there is a need for analysis addressing how this development has impacted international law and what this development means for the evolution of IHL in years ahead, a topic that is addressed in what follows. As noted by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the provisions set out in the Geneva Conventions for the protection of civilian water resources and infrastructure are “binding on all parties to the conflict, even those who have not or cannot sign the conventions, such as non-state armed groups” [85]. The inclusion of “non-state armed groups” clearly applies to a group such as IS, while the Geneva Conventions without question apply to more traditional state-led bearers of force in armed conflict, such as the Syrian regime and the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Regardless of the legal applicability of IHL to “non-state armed groups”, enforceability for legal violations committed by these non-state entities is another matter entirely. Although IS does have ambitions for a degree of state-like legitimacy, a central component of which is operating like a state and demonstrating the ability to deliver services for civilian life to function, such as supplying electricity and water [86], IS has no concerns about flagrant, brutal violations of all aspects of international law. This has been exhaustively demonstrated