Water 2020, 12, 340 16 of 28 the ICC though established in accordance with Article 79 of the Rome Statute, which has a two-fold mandate: (1) to implement Court-ordered reparations and (2) to provide physical, psychological, and material support to victims and their families. Though Rome Statute Article 75 permits mandated reparations, reliance on the Trust Fund will likely become problematic in the near future, as the Fund is not UN-funded (the ICC is independent from the UN), and the ICC is expected to start ordering reparations for crimes committed against large numbers of victims, amounting to “considerable sums” likely exceeding voluntary funding from states [28]. Though the Rome Statute was a significant step towards defining crimes requiring reparations, legal definitions for violations of water rights on which reparations guidelines would be based are exceedingly vague. Furthermore, there is no existing study that applies analysis of laws governing water and environmental crimes to the distinctive needs of the stateless and displaced people most affected by these crimes. As Evans argues, “[R]apidly growing jurisprudence confirms state responsibility to provide reparations for human rights violations caused by state agents or by the failure of states to prevent violations by non-state actors” [28]. Despite these developments, the procedure for securing reparations for victims of crimes committed by non-state actors remains elusive. Additionally, though reparations procedure for victims of human rights atrocities committed by states is clearer, the actuality of this process is also on rocky terrain, and the process is still in the infancy stage of becoming inscribed into international norms via practices of the ICC. Legally determining the necessity of reparations for victims of human rights atrocities remains a significant challenge. “[T]he adoption of a legally-binding instrument that clearly consolidates the rights of victims and the establishment of effective operative redress mechanisms have yet to be realised” [28]. For reparations to be considered and ultimately distributed to victims of atrocities, the crimes with victims entitled to reparations must first be defined. In the case of grave crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humanity, defined in the Rome Statute, Article 75 states: 1. 2. The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis, in its decision the Court may, either upon request or on its own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the principles on which it is acting. The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. [70] Principles for how violations of the human right to water ought to be redressed, however, are non-existent. As previously demonstrated, the Geneva Conventions do “prohibit” destruction of “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population . . . such as . . . drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works . . . ” [34]. Regarding internal conflict, the Conventions state similar principles in Additional Protocol II relating to the Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts: Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works. [35] However, the Geneva Conventions do not specify what the consequences of such destruction are and, importantly for victims, what the process for reparation, compensation, or redress would be. The UNWC, as previously argued, is even more devastatingly vague, merely calling for “discuss[ion]” about “the question of compensation” [74]. The Convention totally omits consideration of “compensation” for victims of violations of the human right to water committed by non-state actors, and a process for securing said “compensation”, even for crimes committed by states, focuses on