5. Embedding Violations: Role of the Assam’s High Court Rather than addressing this core procedural defect, the Gauhati High Court upheld the FT’s proceedings. The Court reasoned that because the SP(B) is the competent authority under the FT Order 1964 to make a reference, the finding of the inquiry officer was “inconsequential.” This position squarely contradicts Moslem Mondal, where the full bench of the High Court expressly held that the SP(B) must base its referral decision on a considered application of mind to the inquiry report and accompanying evidence. The Court’s assertion effectively rendered the inquiry process meaningless, reducing it to a procedural formality rather than a substantive safeguard against arbitrary proceedings. Moreover, the Court compounded this error by delving into the merits of the case, evaluating Mohammad Ali’s documents and testimony rather than first resolving the threshold jurisdictional defect. This approach reversed the proper sequence of judicial scrutiny: where jurisdiction is lacking due to an invalid referral, the FT’s opinion is legally irrelevant and cannot be examined on its merits. By disregarding this principle, the Court not only legitimised proceedings that were void ab initio but also imposed additional evidentiary burdens on the petitioner, forcing him to defend his citizenship in a process that should have been quashed at the outset. The Mohammad Ali ruling exemplifies the Gauhati High Court’s persistent failure to uphold its own procedural jurisprudence and constitutional due process requirements. It reveals how the Court’s selective and inconsistent application of binding precedent facilitates arbitrary and unlawful denationalisation proceedings. By insulating defective referrals from scrutiny and prioritising a merits-based review over jurisdictional integrity, the Court has undermined the procedural safeguards intended to protect individuals from arbitrary state action in citizenship matters. 168