5. Embedding Violations: Role of the Assam’s High Court This pattern implies an unspoken rule: oral evidence without documentary support will not suffice. But, even where documentary support exists, testimony is often still dismissed. In Haliman Bewa,499 for instance, the FT rejected her brother Lokman Ali’s testimony for lacking corroboration— overlooking that Lokman was named in the 1970 voter roll. Rather than correct this error, Justice Bhuyan introduced a new objection: Lokman’s age made him four years older than Haliman, which supposedly cast doubt on her case. This shows how the Court frequently substitutes new grounds for dismissal rather than apply consistent principles. This approach has serious consequences for the integrity of the citizenship determination process. A reliable criterion must be one that can feasibly be met; here, however, even when one criterion is ostensibly satisfied, a new requirement is devised to justify dismissal. In effect, no consistent criterion emerges, rendering the articulated standards meaningless. This pattern also reveals ambiguity about whether testimonies require documentary support. Even when testimonies are corroborated by documents, they are frequently dismissed due to minor discrepancies, suggesting that the High Court’s real approach is one of selective scepticism rather than principled reasoning. Illustrations: ● In Khudeja Begum’s case,500 her sister’s testimony was discarded because her citizenship status had not been independently confirmed. The High Court, required concrete proof of her citizenship to accept her testimony, an expectation not typically imposed on witnesses. ● In Maharjan Nessa’s case, her uncle’s testimony was dismissed because he was unaware of when her father had purchased land in the village, a detail that has no direct bearing on her citizenship status.501 This excessive scrutiny suggests that the High Court may be invoking additional requirements on a case-by-case basis. In stark contrast, testimonies contradicting the defendant’s claims of citizenship are accepted without the same scrutiny. For instance, in Ibrahim Ali’s case,502 his brother’s testimony that their father was Nur Islam was used to support the finding that Nurul Islam on the 1965 voter roll was not their father. 154 Here, Justice Manojit Bhuyan did not question the veracity of the testimony, as he typically does when the evidence supports a defendant’s case.503 This selective application of standards reveals an inconsistent approach that has an appearance of bias. 499 Haliman Bewa @ Haliman Nessa Bewa v. Union of India WP(C) 7313/2016 (Gauhati High Court, 6 March 2018). Khudeja Begum (n 363). Maharjan Nessa (n 418). 502 Ibrahim Ali Mir (n 389). 503 Maharjan Nessa (n 418); Sufiya Khatun (n 366); Subiya Khatun (n 488). 500 501