5. Embedding Violations: Role of the Assam’s High Court Discrepancies in Names One of the clearest markers of arbitrariness in High Court decisions appears in cases involving minor discrepancies in names, ages, or personal details (see §4.2.11). Across comparable cases, the Court has treated such inconsistencies in contradictory ways— accommodating the petitioner’s evidence in only four cases,505 while usually rejecting it outright. This inconsistency casts serious doubt on whether decisions are guided by any principled or coherent evidentiary standard. In cases involving minor name discrepancies across documents, the Court’s approach has been strikingly uneven. In Subha Das,505 Justice B.K. Sharma ruled in favour of the petitioner despite variations in her parents’ names: they appeared as “Ashini Kumar Roy” and “Primila Sundari” in some records and “Ashini Kumar Das” and “Urmila Sundari” in others. Sharma reconciled these discrepancies, reasoning that other particulars aligned and the variations did not undermine the overall reliability of the evidence. By contrast, Rajendra Das was denied relief for an equally trivial discrepancy.507 The 1970 voter roll listed him as the son of “Radha Charan,” while the 1966 roll referred to “Radhacharan Das.” Justice Amitava Roy treated this as a fatal inconsistency, without considering that the missing surname was likely an administrative oversight. No explanation was offered for why this variation was disqualifying, unlike in Subha Das. The inconsistency between these decisions suggests that discrepancies are invoked selectively, serving as a pretext for rejection rather than reflecting an objective evidentiary rule. This pattern becomes even clearer in cases involving honorifics or culturally common name variations. In Rahman Ali,508 the Court rejected the petitioner’s claim because his mother’s name appeared as both “Hajera Nessa” and “Hajera Khatun” across documents. The Court failed to acknowledge that “Khatun” is a common honorific for Muslim women in Assam, and such variation is culturally typical. Yet in Manjula Dhar,509 Justice Ujjal Bhuyan reconciled a similar discrepancy in the mother’s name, reasoning that it reflected a post-marriage name change, without subjecting the evidence to further scrutiny. 156 These examples reveal that whether discrepancies are reconciled or treated as disqualifying depends not on consistent legal reasoning, but seemingly on whether the judge is inclined to accept the petitioner’s case. The result is not the application of a standard, but a discretionary choice. 505 Rahim Ali (n 2); Sirajul Hoque (n 384); Md. Anuwar Hussain (n 384); Motior Rahman (n 384). Subha Rani Das (n 392). Rajendra Das (n 388). 508 Rahman Ali (n 385). 509 Manjula Nag (n 504). 506 507