S TAT E L E S S B Y D E C R E E She added that as a result of the stripping of her husbandʼs citizenship, along with genderunequal property ownership laws, she and her husband had lost the right to purchase a home and that a previously agreed loan had to be rearranged with more onerous terms. She stated that: “The government has le� us hanging, giving us not many statements, no decisions, and no clarity about our rights, our entitlements, or our future in this country a�er stripping away my husband and children's citizenships. [...][T]hey are pressuring my husband to rush and obtain the nationality that his grandfather gave up in the 1970's, or else be deprived of everything.” Shuaib (name used by agreement) told our organisations that his father was naturalised as a Kuwaiti in 1968, at the age of 27. The government claimed that he had used a false name - that of a Kuwaiti friend - to acquire nationality. Shuaib told our organisations that the authorities knew of this fraud since 1971, but that it was not addressed. Shuaib claimed that he is a relatively well known media figure in Kuwait, whose links are only with Kuwait. He argues that he did nothing wrong: that he should not be held responsible for an act committed by his father, which has now impacted on all those dependent on his fatherʼs citizenship, and that it could have been addressed with a name change. SN A PSH OT 3 Article 13 revocations, including retaliation linked to the exercise of freedom of expression and opinion 110 For more on this issue, see some of the cases above, in Scope and operation of citizenship revocations in 2024-2025. Revocations based on Article 13 and 21 bis A of the Nationality Law enabled the GoK to create a security narrative for its campaign. Authorities claim that they target criminals such as those who acquired citizenship through fraud, forgery or misrepresentation, where the person has been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude, dishonesty, or of crimes against the internal or external security, political leadership or religious figures.111 As 13.4 states, it targets people where the “supreme interest of the State or its external security so requires” (see Appendix). In practice, Article 13 revocations overlap and go hand-in-hand with corollary GoK measures meant to restrict freedom of expression and opinion. Article 13 was amongst the first bases the GoK cited: on 17 March 2024, a report related that they had stripped 26 people of their citizenship for forgery and fraud. In scores of instances, the basis for the revocation of citizenship is unclear. In November 2024, Zahra (pseudonym) learned that the authorities revoked her citizenship, stating that it was granted by an “administrative decision” instead of Amiri decree. Born to an Egyptian father and Kuwaiti mother, with no effective link to any other country except Kuwait, she became a naturalised Kuwaiti in 2009. As a result of the decision, the authorities froze her bank account, making her own resources unavailable and stopped her from working, thus suspending her salary for seven months. Officials prevented her from seeking legal redress so she had, as at August 2025, no right of effective appeal. She told our organisations that the authorities “terrorised” those stripped of their citizenship, effectively restricting their right of expression, to publicly complain or seek redress. 43