A/HRC/25/28 nationality on a particular ground, while another may adopt the same ground as a basis for attributing to the authorities the power to deprive an individual of his or her nationality. In some instances, the withdrawal of nationality — for example, on the ground of fraud — may be deemed under domestic law to be an act of nullification rather than loss or deprivation of nationality. Regardless of the terminology or legal construction in domestic law, measures that result in the loss or deprivation of nationality should be qualified as such and are subject to relevant international norms and standards. A. General considerations regarding loss or deprivation of nationality 4. Any interference with the enjoyment of nationality has a significant impact on the enjoyment of rights.5 Therefore, loss or deprivation of nationality must meet certain conditions in order to comply with international law, in particular the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality. These conditions include serving a legitimate purpose, being the least intrusive instrument to achieve the desired result and being proportional to the interest to be protected.6 Where loss or deprivation of nationality leads to statelessness, the impact on the individual is particularly severe. International law therefore strictly limits the circumstances in which loss or deprivation of nationality leading to statelessness can be recognized as serving a legitimate purpose. The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961 Convention) and the 1997 European Convention on Nationality both accept that statelessness may, exceptionally, result from the loss or deprivation of nationality in response to its fraudulent acquisition.7 The 1961 Convention establishes a set of basic rules which prohibit loss or deprivation of nationality where the result is to leave an individual stateless. The 1961 Convention contains a limitative set of exceptions to these rules, recognizing a narrow set of circumstances in which loss or deprivation of nationality leading to statelessness may serve a legitimate purpose.8 Even in such cases, however, the loss or deprivation of nationality must satisfy the principle of proportionality. The consequences of any withdrawal of nationality must be carefully weighed against the gravity of the behaviour or offence for which the withdrawal of nationality is prescribed. Given the severity of the consequences where statelessness results, it may be difficult to justify loss or deprivation resulting in statelessness in terms of proportionality.9 5. In spite of the broad recognition of the right to a nationality as a fundamental human right and the need to avoid legislative and administrative measures leading to statelessness, many domestic frameworks still provide incomplete safeguards against statelessness. In most cases, this is because the legislation itself does not differentiate the situation in which a person would be left stateless from any other situation of loss or deprivation of nationality. Where legislative safeguards are in place, they may be difficult to implement, in particular with regard to the understanding of the meaning of statelessness or the 5 6 7 8 9 4 A detailed report of the impact of deprivation of nationality on the enjoyment of human rights is contained in A/HRC/19/43. A/HRC/13/34, para. 25; European Court of Human Rights, application No. 31414/96, Karassev and Family v. Finland, 12 January 1999; Court of Justice of the European Union, Case No. C-135/08, Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, 2 March 2010. On the notion of “arbitrary” under international law, for instance in the context of deprivation of liberty, see A/HRC/22/44, para. 61, including the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, cited in footnote 28 therein. 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, art. 8, para. 2(b); 1997 European Convention on Nationality, art. 7, para. 3. 1961 Convention, arts. 7, paras. 4 and 5; 8, paras. 2 and 3. Court of Justice of the European Union, Case No. C-135/08, Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern, 2 March 2010.