330 R. Vecellio Segate recognition systems, even for the most complex operations to be performed in person? And will the management of one’s identity by banks impact the erasure (or lack thereof) of the same person’s identity by state authorities? Policy reports on how to develop technical systems for digital identities that comply with anti-money laundering regulations, confirm that governments back (or even themselves implement) limited-purpose ID systems in addition to general-purpose ones (Financial Action Task Force 2019, §52–53), and that ‘[i]n the digital era, we have begun to see new models, with digital credentials provided by, or in partnership with, the private sector being recognised by the government as official proof of identity in an online environment’ (ibid., §54). Banks are thus indispensable actors in identity management with public implications, which makes it even more alarming that some of the most updated guidelines on these matters (e.g. European Banking Authority 2022) provide no satisfactory answer to the questions posed above – no mention of identity reassignment, identity erasure, liaison with different state authorities, and so forth. From a slightly different angle, it was accepted that ‘[i]n the case of refugees, proof of official identity may also be provided by an internationally recognised organisation with such mandate’ (ibid., §55): the interfaces between refugee law and public-private partnerships (PPPs) in this respect are yet to be explored. For example, would most States be prepared to endorse an alternative banking circuit dedicated to refugees, supported by its own technical standards, whereby refugees could safely declare their “previous” identity for the purpose of claiming their savings back, to then move on with their new life and new comprehensive (can even be generalpurpose) identity? Shadow banks already exist and work well, but alternative official circuits would be unprecedented. To be sure, my suggestion is not that asylum seekers shall express informed consent and enjoy a right to non-disclosure or non-registration of their identity: this would not be practicable, and it would not be supported by customary law; rather, what I advise is that asylum seekers do have an obligation to undergo identification, so long as States formally pledge to never deploy it against them for as long as their vulnerable condition endures – especially towards forcible repatriation. I accept that finding the “right” balance is an edging exercise at a constant risk of failure due to States’ political overreaction to what they perceive as migratory “threats”, mostly motivated by domestic deals with the electorate. To put it straight, political overstretching is always round the corner – paradoxically, especially so in democracies whereby politicians are accountable to electorates’ sentiment. The already mentioned WB’s ID4D suggests that in the case of refugees, the UNHCR itself could serve as the introducer (World Bank Group 2022, 2). This is idyllic advice as it is naïve: it would probably stand as the cheapest option, but for a host of political and practical reasons, States are unlikely to take it on board. The considerations above should read explanatory enough, but I wish to illustrate three reasons